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Summary findings
In the Uruguay Round negotiations, trade distorting  Less positively, although trade restrictions on
agricultural policies were taken up substantively for the  agricultural products were converted to tariffs, border
first time in any round  of multilateral trade negotiations.  protection was reduced less on agricultural than on
Voluntary export restraints outside the Multifibre  industrial products, and there was little agreement on
Arrangement (MFA) were in fact eliminated.  reducing trade-affecting subsidies.
Developing countries became equal partners with  The textiles and clothing agreement binds developed
developed countries. Their tariff cuts covered as large a  countries to eliminate all MFA-sanctioned restrictions
share of imports as those of the developed countries and  but allows them to largely put off doing so until 2005.
were deeper. Because developing country tariffs were  Concessions to which developing countries agreed are
higher to start with, their cuts will save importers more  due now. Reciprocal concessions of particular  interest
(per dollar of imports covered) than will cuts by  are either due in the future (elimination of the MFA) or
developed countries. Tariff bindings for most developing  yet to be negotiated (liberalization of agricultural trade).
countries, although often above applied rates, were  Also disquieting, since the Uruguay Round, developing
extended to 90 percent  or more of imports.  countries have undertaken antidumping cases at a rate
Few countries agreed to give foreigners unlimited  (per dollar of imports) three times higher than that for
market access in services, or full national treatment in  the United States -mostly  against other developing
more than a few service activities. But developed  countries.
countries agreed to some liberalization of cross-border
provision for 70 percent of service activities (compared
with 25 percent in developing countries).
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VMarket Access Advances and Retreats Since the Uruguay Round Agreement
by
J. Michael Finger and Ludger Schuknecht
The Uruguay Round has been justly celebrated for the innovations it represents: coverage
extended to services, intellectual property, trade-related investment issues, much greater
attention to the rules of trade-policy making and administration, a new and unified organization
to administer the agreements.  At the same time, the Uruguay Round dealt significantly with the
more or less traditional subject of the GATT - market access: tariff cuts as broad in scope as
those of any previous round were agreed, policies that affect trade in agricultural products were
taken up for the first time, agreement was reached to eliminate restrictions on trade in textiles
and clothing under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement.2 This paper deals only with market access. In
it we present a tally of:
•  implementation of market access commitmnents,  i.e., of the agreed removal or reduction of
import restrictions and,
*  use of various "safeguard" and other measures that the agreement provides that allow a
member government to introduce new trade restrictions.
Our report thus has no thesis to advance, it is not an essay, it is a tabulation of the amount of
liberalization that has resulted from the Uruguay Round Agreements, and of slippage from that
liberalization.  Our objective is not to count up to see which part is larger, the agreed
liberalization versus the allowed "backsliding."  No doubt, the liberalization has been larger, by
several orders of magnitude.  Nevertheless, it is important to keep a close watch on the use of
allowed backsliding.
Our major findings are the following:
1.  Much was achieved.  Tariff cuts compare well to the coverage and depth of cuts achieved at
the Tokyo and Kennedy Rounds.  Agricultural protection was dealt with substantively for the
first time, VERs outside of MFA have been phased out.  The agreement to remove MFA-
based quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing is of itself a major
accomplishment.
2.  There has been minimal backsliding, minimal use of the special or general provisions for
imposing new restrictions that the various WTO agreements provide.  Antidumping is the
one exception.
3.  Tariff cuts by developing countries were as broad and at the same time, deeper, than those
conceded by the developed economies.
4.  The major part of what developing economies gave is due now, the major part of what they
receive will not be delivered until 2005, or is yet to be negotiated.  What they gave (apart
from the exchange of tariff cuts) was mainly acceptance of "codes" on major areas of
2 We do not review in  this paper these  "rules" areas  of the Uruguay  Round  agreements.  They are taken  up in J.
Michael  Finger  and Philip  Schuler,  "Implementation  of Uruguay  Round  Commitments:  The Development
Challenge,"  World  Bank  Staff Working  Paper,  forthcoming.
1domestic as well as import regulation/institutions (e.g., intellectual property, technical and
sanitary standards, customs valuation, import licensing procedures).  What they got in return
from the developed economies is MFA elimination - not due until 2005 - trade liberalization
and reduction of domestic support on agricultural products - yet to be negotiated.  Details are
provided below.
1.  TARIFF  NEGOTIATIONS
At the Uruguay Round, some 130 countries or customs areas made tariff concessions.
Within the mechanics of the GATT/WTO, a member makes a concession by submitting to the
organization a schedule of commitments, of bound rates.  In doing so, the member accepts a
legal obligation not to impose a duty on any listed product at a rate higher than the specified
bound rate.  Its schedule of bound rates defines a member's legal obligations on tariff rates -
there was no legal commitment to cut tariffs by a specified amount and thus no "official"
measure of the tariff reductions exchanged at the Round.
As the negotiations matured, a frequently mentioned "target" was that developed
members should reduce their tariffs by one-third, developing members should reduce theirs by
one fourth.  The discussion surrounding these targets was not precise, e.g., as to whether the base
should be all merchandise imports or only industrial goods, all tariff lines vs. all dutiable tariff
lines, or even if the appropriate formula was dT/T or dT/(lI+T). Members also engaged in a
related discussion of how bindings of unilateral liberalizations would be treated, all of this
complicated by an imprecision as to what date should be used to determine the "before" tariff
rates.
In Table TI along with Charts TI and T2, we summarize our measures of the increase of
bindings and the tariff reductions that will result from Uruguay Round commitments. 3
INCREASES  OF BINDINGS
Expansions of bindings are simple to conceptualize - the amount of some base year's
imports that would be covered by the new bindings versus the old.  Increased bindings by
developing economies are evident from Chart T1.  Developing economies sometimes bound
tariffs at levels above currently applied rates and some members' tariff concessions consisted of
binding tariffs at rates to which they had previously been reduced unilaterally.  More information
will be provided below both on ceiling bindings and on bindings of unilateral concessions.
TARIFF  REDUCTIONS
We find that Uruguay Round commitments by the developing economies to reduce their
tariffs compare well with the commitments of the developed economies.
*  developing economies'  tariff cuts cover approximately the same percentage of imports,
*  developing economies'  tariff cuts are actually deeper.
3Though we use here the labels "developed" and "developing," the classification of countries used in these
calculations is the World Bank's sorting of countries as either high-income economies (HIES) or low and
middle income economies (LMIEs), that includes transition economies.  The following footnote provides
details of country coverage of the two categories.
2Depth of cut 4
Our calculations of depth of tariff cut depart in two ways from the way that the GATT
tariff cuts are traditionally measured. First, GATT tariff cuts are usually measured only over the
import categories on which cuts are made; e.g., "a 30% cut on 40% of imports" does not mean
that the tariff, on average, is now 30 percent lower.  It means that the tariff is, on average, .4 x
30%, or 12 percent lower.  We include "zero cuts" in our average. 5
Second, it is obvious that a 50 percent reduction of a 2% tariff rate does not improve
market access the same as cutting a 40% rate in half. Taking this into account, we have
calculated tariff changes from the formula
dT/(1+T)
where T is the ad valorem tariff rate, or ad valorem equivalent. From the perspective of an
exporter, dT/(l+T) measures the percentage by which she can reduce her delivered price in the
importing country while keeping the net price she collects (after the tariff) the same. This comes
to less than 1 percent if a 2% rate is cut in half, to more than 14 percent if a 40% rate is cut in
half.  We consider, thus, the formula dT/(l+T)  to provide the more appropriate measure of
market access improvement.
Because of the tariff cuts, exporters on average will be able to reduce an additional 1
percent of what buyers pay in developed economies, 2.3 percent more of what buyers pay in
developing economies.  These figures are less exciting that reports of "tariffs being cut world-
wide by an average of 40 percent," that were in newspapers the day after the agreement was
completed. 6
Generally, the tariff cuts were made in five annual stages, the last on January 1, 1999.
There were some exceptions in each direction, toward quicker implementation and toward
slower.
4The results reported in this section come in large part from Finger, Ingco and Reincke.  That source provides more
extensive information on tariff concessions given and received by major Uruguay Round participants.
Finger, Ingco and Reincke also provide a detailed discussion of which date were taken as the "before" and
the "after" Uruguay Round tariff rates.  Conceptualization of "before" and "after" followed practice
developed by the GATT/WTO Secretariat, the dominant concern being to isolate tariff cuts that took place as
a result of Uruguay Round commitments, not to count politically unilateral tariff cuts that took place while
the round was under way.  The basic data source for Finger, Ingco and Reincke is the GATT/WTO Integrated
Data Base (IDB) that provides electronic data on the Uruguay Round schedules of commitments plus
corresponding trade data for 40 major participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations (counting the then 12
members of the European Union as one participant).
The IDB covers 98 percent of merchandise (excluding petroleum) imports of the GATT contracting parties at
the time of the round.  Finger, Ingco and Reincke followed the World Bank convention of dividing economies
into high income vs. low and middle income. By this classification, the IDB covers 14 high-income
economies  plus 26 "transition" and "developing" economies. With the exception of Hong Kong, all of the
countries classified as high income are OECD members.  Mexico and Korea, though OECD members, are
classified as developing countries.
5  That we are focusing on market access may seem an obvious point, but experience with previous drafts indicates
that readers will view our information from different perspectives.  Some, for example, have commented that
in calculating the percentage of imports subject to tariff cuts, we should have excluded already duty-free
imports from the denominator - that a country with 80 percent duty free imports at the beginning could not
have done more than make cuts on 20 percent. Our figures compare the percentage of countries'  imports
affected by Uruguay Round concessions, on who did what.  They do not compare who was more generous,
who might have done what, or who tried harder.
6 The quote in this sentence is from the Financial Times, December 16, 1993,  page 1.
3Bindings of unilateral reductions
Table T3 reports for selected countries the percentage of recent tariff reductions that have
been bound at the Uruguay Round. 7 The countries in Table T3 are not the only countries that
implemented unilateral liberalizations, they are the countries for which we could find data to
measure the unilateral tariff liberalization, as well as the reduction agreed at the Uruguay Round.
Overall, our figures show that the countries in the group have bound somewhat less than
half of the unilateral concessions that they have implemented since 1986. Measured by the
dT/(l +T) formula, that comes to a bound cut of 8 to 12 percent for a number of Latin American
countries and a 22 percent cut for India.  Again, such figures compare favorably with the tariff
cuts agreed and bound by the developed economies at the Uruguay Round.
REMAINING  TARIFFS
Table T2 presents post Uruguay Round averages of bound and of applied rates.  Even
though the developing economies agreed to larger cuts at the Uruguay Round, and a number of
them also implemented unilateral reductions, their tariffs are still on average considerably higher
than those of the developed economies.
Chart T3 provides the same information graphically. Generally, remaining patterns of
tariff protection have the following characteristics:
1.  Tariffs are disproportionally imposed against the exports of developing economies.
2.  Tariffs are disproportionally imposed by the developing economies.
3.  Biases against developing country exports are in developing economies' tariffs as much as in
the developed economies' tariffs.
Beneath the low average tariffs of the developed economies there remain some
significant tariff peaks, i.e., rates which are more than three times the national average.  In
several developed economies more than 10 percent of tariff lines bear rates more than three times
as high as the national average. (Laird, 1999). The sectors with such peaks tend to be those of
greater export interest to developing economies: footwear, leather and leather goods, food
products, agriculture and textiles/clothing (UNCTAD/WTO, 1998) (a separate discussion of
these latter product categories follows below).  Both developing and developed economies
display this tendency to impose higher import duties on goods of particular export interest to
developing economies.  That is why we see the pattern that Chart T3 reports.
TARIFF  REDUCTIONS  SINCE  THE URUGUAY  ROUND
WTO members at several negotiations since the Uruguay Round have agreed to
significant further tariff reductions (Table T4). The largest of these reductions carne together in
the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products which by the fall of
7These  results  are taken  from Finger  and Winters  (1998). The data that  were used and the formulas  for calculating
total, bound  and reciprocal  reductions  are explained  there. Intuitively,  suppose  an applied  tariff rate, initially
50%, is reduced  in a unilateral  liberalization  to 20%. Suppose  the country  also agrees  to bind the rate  on that
tariff line  at 30%. The Total  reduction  is (50-20)  or 30 percentage  points;  the Bound  Reduction  is (50-30)  or
20 percentage  points. The Reciprocal  Reduction,  the reduction  conditioned  on the Uruguay  Round,  is what
the Uruguay  Round  adds to the Total  Reduction.  In this example,  the bound  rate is above  the unilaterally
assigned  applied  rate, so the Reciprocal  Reduction  is zero. Had  the Uruguay  Round bound  rate  been 10%,
the Total  Reduction  would  be (50-10),  the Bound  reduction  would  be (50-10)  and the Reciprocal  Reduction
would  be (20-10).
41997 had accumulated 43 signatories who thereby committed to a stepwise tariff elimination -
on an MFN basis - on information technology products. 8
This liberalization is impressive in both scope and depth. The Information Technology
Agreement covers some big items like semiconductors, computers, scientific instruments and
software - in 1997, more than 10 percent of world merchandise trade.  Uruguay Round tariff
cuts, we noted above, covered about 30 percent of world merchandise trade. The tariffs in
question are more or less in line with the averages in most of the countries involved, hence the
depth of cut will be in the same range as the depth of the Uruguay Round cuts.
Another post-Uruguay Round liberalization involved Canada, the European Union,
Japan, Macau, Switzerland-Liechtenstein, and the US who agreed to eliminate tariffs by April
1997 on 465 pharmaceutical products, and on another 639 products by July 1999. These
negotiated tariff eliminations followed an understanding during the Uruguay Round to hold such
negotiating meetings at least every three years.  These eliminations come in addition to 6,000
duty-free products already covered under the pharmaceutical initiative in the Uruguay Round.
The third instance, the EU and the US agreed in 1997 to reduce tariffs on distilled spirits,
with the objective of eliminating tariffs on most of these products by 2000.
POLICING THE TARIFF CUTS
WTO Members created no specific mechanism to monitor the implementation tariff
commitments. "Monitoring" will be done by traders - if a trader is asked to pay a duty above the
importing country's bound rate, the trader's govermnent can take the situation to the WTO
dispute settlement process. As of March 1999, only one such situation has been brought to WTO
dispute settlement, and the case is now under consultation.
The Integrated Data Base 9 itself is an important instrument for monitoring
implementation of tariff commitments and increasing the transparency of tariff protection.  The
IDB was first pulled together to aid negotiators during the Uruguay Round. Since July 1997,
members are required'0 to notify annually bound and applied tariff rates plus annual import
statistics at the tariff line level.  As of January 1999, 52 countries had made submissions to the
1DB and a further 7 had requested technical assistance to do so.  Submissions however were not
always complete, bound rates have been included in only 33 of the 52 submissions.1'
For most of the signatories,  tariffs  will be eliminated  by January  2000,  for a few, by January  2005.
9 The IDB is an electronic  database. All Members  have submitted  (at least)  paper copies  of their schedules  of
commitments.
'°General  Council  decision  of 16 July 1997  (WT/L/225).
Adapting  data to recent changes  and the technical  challenge  of producing  submissions  for 8 or 10  thousand  tariff
lines  are the major  reasons  for delays.
5TABLE Ti:  URUGUAY ROUND TARIFF CONCESSIONS  GIVEN AND RECEIVED
Bindings  1  Tariff reductions
(percentage of 1989 imports)  Depth of cut
pre-UR  post-UR  % of imports  (dT/(I+T)
Tariff  Concessions Given - All merchandise
Developed Economies  80  89  30  1.0
Developing Economies  30  81  29  2.3
All  73  87  30  1.2
Tariff Concessions Received - All merchandise
Developed Economies  77  91  36  1.4
Developing Economies  64  78  28  1.0
All  73  87  33  1.3
Bindings  Tariff reductions
(percentage of 1989 imports)  Depth of cut
Tariff Concessions Given - Industrial goods  pre-UR  post-UR  % of imports  (dT/(l+T)
Developed Economies  85  92  32  I
Developing Economies  32  84  33  2.7
All  77  91  32  1.3
Bindings  Tariff reductions
(percentage of 1989 imports)  Depth of cut
Tariff Concessions Received - Industrial goods  pre-UR  post-UR  % of imports  (dT/(l+T)
Developed Economies  79  93  37  1.5
Developing Economies  72  86  36  1.2
All  77  91  37  1.4
6TABLE  T2: POST-URUGUAY  ROUND TARIFF  RATES,  ALL MERCHANDISE
Bound  rate,  1  post-UR  bound  applied  rate,
Average ad  rate above  average ad
valorem  applied rate'  valorem
Developed Economies  3.5  19  2.6
Developing Economies  25.2  37  13.3
All  6.5  l  22  4.3
aPercentage of 1989 imports.
TABLE T3: URUGUAY  ROUND TOTAL,  BOUND AND RECIPROCAL  REDUCTIONS  OF
SELECTED  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
Country  Total  Bound  Reciprocal  Percentage of
Reduction  Reduction  Reduction  Total
Reduction
,____  ____  ___  ___  _B ound
Argentina  16  9  .001  57
Brazil  25  12  .007  47
Chile  19  8  0  39
Mexico  27  8  .004  30
Peru  20  9  .03  46
Uruguay  6  3  _  .009  _41
Venezuela  19  2  _  _  0.2  12
India  |  27  22  4.8  82
Average, weighted by import value  39
7TABLE T4: POST-URUGUAY  ROUND TARIFF CONCESSIONS
Products  Countries  Concessions  Trade covered
Pharmaceutical  Canada, EC, Japan,  Duty free treatment for  ...
products  Macao,  465 pharmaceutical
Switzerland/Liechtenstein,  products from 4/97 and
USA  for another 639 products
from 7/99. At the
Uruguay Round, these
members agreed to duty
free treatment of some
6000 products.
Information  43 WTO Members and  Stepwise elimination of  Covers about 10%
technology  acceding Members  tariffs on information  of world - 93
products  technology products until  percent of world
January 2000, selected  trade in IT products
countries until 2005 see  of US$ 500 billion
ITA for product cover)  in 1997
Distilled spirits  USA, EC  Tariff reductions for  ...
distilled spirits in 1997;
most tariffs will be
i________________________________  L  _______reduced  to zero by 2000
Source: Rectifications and Modifications of Uruguay Round Schedules
8CHART  Ti:  COVERAGE  OF GATT  TARIFF  BINDINGS,  PRE-  AND POST-URUGUAY  ROUND
(Industrial  Goods)
1  00  . - U  - - - -
90--~  ~  ~  ..-  - - .
70  .
ci  60




10  \'  - " ..  0post-UR
10
Imports o:  pre
Developed  Economies
Developing Economies






Dewloped EconDnies  Dewloping  Econonies
I10CHART  T3:  POST-URUGUAY  ROUND  MFN TARIFFS  OF DEVELOPING  AND OF INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES  ON MANUFACTURED  PRODUCTS
14-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  ...  . ...  . ..  . ...  ...
14  -





4  On imports from:
2  ,,,~~~~~~~~~~~~~,  ~~~~Developing  Economies
Tariffs  of:  ;  -,  Developed Economies
Developing Economies  2?.
Developed Economies
112.  QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
The Uruguay Round re-emphasized GATT's concern to discipline the use of quantitative
restrictions and similar instruments, and made considerable progress toward that end.  Rules that
allow such restrictions12 have been tightened, and those outside the new rules must be phased
out.  Grey-area measures such as voluntary export restraints are now illegal and existing
measures must be phased out.  In this section we will review notifications to the WTO of legal
quantitative restrictions, and of those made illegal by the Uruguay Round Agreements and
scheduled for elimination. In later sections we will review restrictions that have been imposed
under various of the safeguard provisions in the Uruguay Round Agreements - some of which
provisions allow for quantitative restrictions.
GATT-LEGAL  MEASURES
Several GATT provisions that allow quantitative restrictions do not include notification
requirements.  Principal among these are Articles XX, General Exceptions, and XXI, Security
Exceptions. Article XX covers, inter alia, restrictions to protect public morals (e.g., prohibition
of importation of pornography) to apply technical or sanitary standards, to preserve human,
animal and plant life, restrictions against imports produced by prison labor.
Some countries notify such restrictions, others do not. Table QRI provides indicative
information about the mix of legal quantitative restrictions that Members apply, but it does not
provide reliable information about which Members apply legal quantitative restrictions.'3
Virtually all countries have controls on some imports, e.g., of arms.  The WTO Agreements do
not require that Members report these restrictions and Table QRl indicates that few Members
have chosen to report them.
In Table QR1 we see that 49 times out of 57 (86 percent) Article XX or XXI was the
justification cited for a quantitative restriction.  The most frequently cited paragraph of Article
XX is the one allowing restrictions to protect human, animal or plant live or health.  Outside of
Articles XX and XXI, Article XVIII.B, allowing developing countries to use quantitative
restrictions to defend the balance of payments, is the most frequently cited Article.14
Though Articles XII and XVIII.B still provide for trade restrictions to defend the balance-
of-payments, the Uruguay Round Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions limited the
scope for use of such.  Even before that agreement, developing economies had been under
considerable pressure to remove such restrictions, and use of the provision has declined. Only
India, Nigeria, Tunisia, Bangladesh and Pakistan maintain restrictions under XVIII.B, and
schedules for phasing out balance-of-payment based non-tariff-measures have already been
1 2The Agreements  on Safeguards,  on Agriculture  and on Textiles  and Clothing  allow quantitative  restrictions  in
certain circumstances.  GATT 1994 under Article XI:2 allows quantitative export restrictions to deal with
domestic shortages, also quantitative import restrictions for the application of standards and regulations, etc.
Article XVII allows quantitative restrictions for the allocation of import licenses through state trading
companies, Article XVIIIB for balance of payment reasons.  Quantitative restrictions might also be justified
under the general and security exceptions of Articles XX and XXI.  For agricultural products, Article 4:2 of
the Agriculture Agreement supercedes Article XI:2c of GATT 1994.
13 GATT articles that allow restrictions have proven to be fungible in that almost any restriction can be at least
arguably justified under several GATT provisions (Finger, in Martin and Winters, 1996). There will thus be
a vague margin between restrictions that the GATT allows in principle and those it allows in fact.
4 Notification of measures justified under Article XVIII.B is required.
12agreed with Tunisia and Pakistan. India's restrictions justified under XVIII.B are subject to a
dispute settlement proceeding, and India has re-notified some of the measures under other GATT
articles  Nigeria's BOP-based quantitative restrictions have also been questioned.
MEASURES NOTIFIED FOR POST-URUGUAY ROUND ELIMINATION
The Uruguay Round Safeguards Agreement imposes time limits on all new safeguard
measures.  In concert it requires the phase-out of all existing safeguard measures now legal under
GATT Article XIX.  It also requires the elimination of all VERs and other restraints that would
not be allowed under the Uruguay Round safeguard rules.1 5 Table QR2 lists all such measures
notified by WTO Members.  Only eight of the measures notified are measures taken under
Article XIX that now come under sunset provisions. The brevity of this list, say, in comparison
with the number of antidumping measures in place (below) reflects how infrequently Article
XIX measures have been used to deal with troublesome imports. The other 18 measures listed
are notified as inconsistent with the new Safeguard Agreement and subject to phase-out.  Most of
the measures (of both types) have been eliminated already, the remaining three are scheduled for
elimination at the end of 1999.
The information in Table QR2 demonstrate that VERs have disappeared.  To confirm that
finding we looked for other information on VERs.  A GATT tabulation (GATT 1992) identifying
79 such restraints outside agriculture and textiles/clothing that were in place as of 1992. Korea
(46) and Japan (23) were most frequently involved on the exporters' side.  On the importers' side,
the European Union and the US accounted for 33 and 17 VERs each. Notifications since the
Uruguay Round indicate that these arrangements are gone or will be gone on the deadline
specified in the agreement.  Among exporters, Japan submitted no report of continuing VERs,16
Korea's  report indicates that all VERs with the US and the European Union have been
eliminated. Thailand's  notification indicates the same for the Thai VER on manioc to the
European Union.  Though the WTO does not require such notification, eighteen Members have
notified the WTO that they maintain no quantitative restrictions.  They are listed in a footnote to
Table QRL.
WTO Trade Policy Reviews further support the conclusion that VERs have disappeared.
The most recent TPR for Japan reports that all VERs in which Japan participated have been
eliminated except the Japan-EU VER on cars - and that one will be gone by end 1999 (WTO,
1998). The 1996 Trade Policy Review for the US reports that the VERs agreed with other
countries had been removed (WTO 1997). The accuracy of that finding is confirmed by the fact
that it was not contested in discussion of the Trade Policy Reviews.
Despite this "elimination" of VERs, there are still WTO-legal ways for trade disputes to
be resolved by exporters agreeing to restrain shipments. The antidumping and subsidies,
countervailing measures agreements allow such "undertakings."  Following the filing in 1998 of
antidumping and countervailing duty cases by the US steel industry, the US reached agreement
to a VER with non-WTO member Russia. As of March 1999 when this study was written, Brazil
had proposed to curb exports voluntarily if a US antidumping case is suspended, and much
pressure is being put on Japan to reduce exports to the US.
15  Of course, the fumgibility  of GATT/WTO rules (footnote just above) means that a country wishing to maintain a
grey area measure had several options for defending its legality.
16 The EU notified the VER on Japanese exports of cars that the EU has notified under the phasing out provision of
the Safeguard Agreement.
13OVERALL  PROGRESS  ON NTBs
Tables QR3 and QR4 provide a view of recent reductions in the application of NTBs.
The tabulations summarized in the tables cover export restraints, non-automatic licensing,
variable charges and quantitative restrictions and price-quantity measures, but exclude
antidumping and countervailing duties.
Among OECD countries, the principal finding is that the share of tariff lines affected by
such measures declined significantly, or remained at a very low level (Australia and New
Zealand) in all countries covered. In those two, the index remained constant.  The decline in the
NTB index for Norway is mainly due to the tariffication of a large number of agricultural tariff
lines, the elimination of VERs is a key reason for the decline in NTBs in the US and the EU.
Information on developing economies' use of NTBs extracted from WTO Trade Policy
Reviews suggests a significant reduction in use of NTBs. 17 Colombia, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa and Thailand now take much less recourse to such
trade restrictions.  Among the developed economies listed in Table QR4 (which is based on
TPRs) only one, Brazil, had a higher NTB index value in 1995-98 than 1989-94, and for Brazil
the increase was small, less than 2 percentage points
WTO Trade Policy Reviews explicitly acknowledge the implementation of the Uruguay
Round Agreements in bringing down NTBs in Mexico and Thailand by about 50 percent.  In
Colombia and Korea, the elimination of quantitative restrictions under the balance of payments
provision has resulted in a major reduction of NTBs.  The decline in the use of the balance of
payments provision has been an important achievement in the post-UR period, although it was
not explicitly part of the Uruguay Round package.'8
7 The OECD and the WTO-Trade Policy Reform tabulations are based on data at different levels of aggregation,
hence we cannot compare the incidences of NTBs for developed economies (from the OECD tabulation) with
those for developing economies (from the WTO-Trade Policy Reform tabulation.)
18 Trade Policy Reviews for the other developing countries in Table QR4 did not look into the reasons for the
decline of NTBs.  14TABLE QR1: INDICATIVE  LIST OF NOTIFICATIONS  OF GATT-CONSISTENT*
QUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS  AND  JUSTIFICATIONS,  BY MEMBER
GATT  Articles  or paragraphs  cited
Member  Which  ones (**)  Number:  Product  Categories  Type  of  Year of last
Articles  QR(***)  Notification
Xx,
XXI/Total
Argentina  Vehicles  Q  1997
Australia  XX(b)  l/l  Chemicals  (Ozone  depleting  substances)  P  1996
Chile  XX(b)  1/i  Used  Vehicles  P  1996
Cyprus  XX(b),(d),  XXI(a),(b)  4/4  Various  Industrial  Products  L  1996
Fiji  XX, XXI  2/2  Drugs,  Arms  etc. (anything  seditious)  P  1997
Hong  Kong  XX(b)  1/I  Agricultural  Chemicals  (s.a)  Q,P  1996-1998
Hungar,v  Food,  Textiles,  Wood,  Jewelry,  Motor  Q,L  1996
vehicles
India  XVII,  XVIII:B,  4/6  Food, Chemicals,  Machinery,  Wood,  L,P,O  1996-1997
XX(b),(c),(d),  XXI(b)  Minerals,  Metals,  etc.
Jamaica  XX,  XXI  2/2  Vehicles,  Arms,  Chemicals  L  1998
Japan  Xl:2(c),  XX (b),(g),  4/5  Food,  Mineral  Products,  Chemicals,  Q, 0  1998
XXI(b)(1)  Machinery,  Arms
Korea  XVII,  XVIII:B  0/2  Food,  Mineral  Products,  Textiles  L  1997
Macau  XI:2(b),  XX (b)  1/2  Agricultural  Products,  Chemicals,  Arms,  L, P  1996
Machinery
|Malta  Food,  Chemicals,  Minerals,  Wood,  L  1996
i ____________________  _____________________  M  etals,  Vehicles,  etc.
|Morocco  XX(b),(f),(g),  (j), XXI  5/5  Various  L  1997
New  Zealand  XX(b),(g),()  3/3  Chemicals  (Ozone  depleting  substances)  P  1966
Pakistan  XX  1/I  Food,  Chemicals,  Arms  P  1997
jPeru  XX(b),(g)  2/2  Used  Textiles  and Vehicles  P  1996-1997
Philippines  XVIII:B  0/1  Agricultural  Products,  Oil, Arms.  L,P  1996
Vehicles,  Rubber  Products,  etc.
South  Africa  XX(a),(b),(c),  4/4  Agricultural  Products,  Oil, Arms,  L  1996
XXI:b(ii)  Chemicals,  Rubber,  Metals,  etc.
Turkey  XI:2(a),  9/10  Animals,  Food,  Chemicals,  Textiles,  Q,P  1996-1998
XX(a),(b),(c),(d),(f),(g)  Arms
,(h);  XXI:(b)(i),  (b)(ii)
Venezuela  XX(b),(g),(I)  3/3  Minerals,  Chemicals,  Rubber,  Textiles,  L,P  1996
Used  Vehicles
Zambia  XX(g),  XXI  2/2  Ivory,  Wood,  Metals  P,L,O  1996
Totals  49/57
Source: Notifications submitted by Member Countries to the Market Access Committee
(n) Only GATT Articles
(S') Four countries in addition to the three listed here maintained atthe end of 1998  quantitative restrictions under the balance of payment provision (Article XVM.B)  They are
Bangladesh, Nigeria (no conclusion of last consultation), Pakistan and Tunisia.
("')  P=Prohibition, Q--Quota, L=Licensing, O-Other
P includes: Prohibition (P), Prohibition except under defined conditions (CP)
Q includes:  Global quota (GQ), Global quota  allocated by country (GQC), Bilateral  quota (BQ)
L includes: Automatic licensing (AL), Non-automatic licensing (NAL)
0 includes  QR made effective through state trading (STR), Mining regulation (MXR), Mistimuin  Price (MPR), Voluntary Export Restraint  (VER)
Note: Counstries  which notified that they do not maintain quantitative restrictions and year of notifications: Bahrain (1997), Bolivia (1997), Beunei Darussalamn  (1996), Costa Rica (1998),
Dorninican Republic (1996), Gambia(1997), Haihi  (1998), Honduras (1997), Iceland (1996), Liechtenstein (1997), Mongolia(1998), Paraguay (1998), Singapore (1996), Switzerland
(1997), Trinidad/Tobago (1996-1998), Uganda (1996), United Arab Emirates (1997), Uruguay (1996)
15TABLE QR2: PRE-EXISTING  MEASURES NOTIFIED BY MEMBERS AS SUBJECT TO
ELIMINATION UNDER RULES ADOPTED AT THE URUGUAY ROUND
(grey area measures and measures legal under Article XIX now subject to sunset provisions)
Importing  Restrained Exporters  Product  Instrument  Elimination  Sfg. Agm.
Member  (if available)  Date  Articlea
Cyprus  All countries  Most imports  QRs, Prohibitions,  31.12.98  11
discretionary licensing
EC  Dried Grapes  Minimum Import  31.12.99  10
Price
EC  Preserved Cherries  Minimum Import  31.12.99  10
Price
EC  Non-EC Countries  Live Bovine Animals  QR (Import License)  01.07.95  11
EC  Non-EC Countries  Swine and Meat of  QR (Import License)  01.07.95  11
Swine
EC  Non-EC Countries  Rabbit Meat  QR (Authorization)  01.07.95  11
EC  All countries  Potatoes  QR (Certificates)  01.11.98  11
EC  Non-EC Countries, except those with  Preserved Sardines  QR (Global Quota)  31.12.96 a preferential agreement with the EC
EC  Non-EC Countries, except those with  Preserved Tuna  QR (Global Quota)  31.12.96  11
a preferential agreement with the EC
EC  Non-EC Countries  Lignite  QR  31.12.96  11
EC  Non-EC Countries  Coal  QR (Authorization)  31.12.97  11
EC  Japan  Motor Vehicles  VER  31.12.99  11
EC  Korea  Microwave Ovens  VER  02.06.97  11
EC  Korea  Color Picture Tubes  VER  02.06.97  11
EC  Thailand  Manioc  VER  30.06.95  11
Japan  Korea  Chestnuts, shelled  VER  31.12.98  11
Korea  People's Rep. Of China  Hot Bean Paste  QR (Import License)  31.12.99  10
Nigeria  All countries  Wheat Flour  Import Prohibition  no date  10
provided
Nigeria  All countries  Sorghum  Import Prohibition  no date  10
provided
Nigeria  All countries  Millet  Import Prohibition  no date  10
provided
Nigeria  All countries  Gypsum  Import Prohibition  no date  10
provided
Nigeria  All countries  Kaolin  Import Prohibition  no date  10
.______________________________  ___________________  provided
South  All countries  Oil and Oil Products,  QR (Import licenses)  31.12.98, 31.  1 
Africa  ~~~~~~~~~Petroleum,  Chemicals,  QR(motlcne)  12.96, 31.07.
Rubber, Plastic  96, 28.02.97
UK,  Korea  Stainless Steel Flat-  VER  31.12.98
Germany  ware
all  Wood in various forms, Special Export Tax,  01.01.97 and
countries  Slovenia  Metal Waste and Scrap rates 10 to 25 %  01.01.98  _
all WTO  Korea  Oysters in airtight  VER  31.12.98  11
Members  containers
Source: Notifications submitted by Member Countries to the WTO Committee on Safeguards
a  Article 10, GATT XIX measures; Article 11, VERs and other measures inconsistent with the Safeguards Agr.
16TABLE QR3:  CORE NON TARIFF MEASURES* IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES
(Share of tariff lines with at least one NTB, in percentage)
Country  1993  1996
Australia  0.3  0.3
Canada  1.4  1.2
EU  9.4  4.2
Iceland  2.8  0.7
Japan  3.8  2.6
Mexico  2  1
New Zealand  0  0
Norway  24  3.8
Switzerland  3.5  0.2
Turkey  0.1  0.2
U.S.  10.3  2.9
Source: OECD 1997
* Core Non-Tariff Measures include: export restraints, non-automatic
licensing, other quantitative restrictions, variable charges and other
price control measures. The figures do not cover antidumping,
countervailing duties and voluntary export/price restraints.
17TABLE  QR4 CORE  NON-TARIFF  MEASURES  IN SELECTED  DEVELopING  ECONOMIES
Economy  Relative incidence of
NTBs  19 9 5 -98 b














Source:  WTO Trade Policy Reviews
a Core Non-Tariff Measures include: export restraints, non-automatic licensing, other quantitative restrictions,
variable charges, and other price control measures. The figures do not include coverage of antidumping,
countervailing  duties and  voluntary  export/price  restraints.
b Relative  NTB incidence  where  NTB incidence  is measured  by the share of 85 broad  data categories  with at least
one NTB.
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183.  TEXTILES  AND CLOTHING
Since the 1930s, developed economies have used negotiated or "voluntary" export
restraints to limit their imports of textiles and clothing.'9 Finally, in the Uruguay Round
Agreements, the international community decided to put an end to this practice.  The major
provisions for eliminating quotas and VERs on textiles and clothing are as follows:
*  all textiles and clothing products will be "integrated into GATT 1994" in four stages
(1/1/1995, 1/1/1998, 1/1/2002, 1/1/2005); encompassing 16 percent, 17 percent, 18 percent
and 49 percent (by 1990 volume) of imports of all specified textiles and clothing products;
*  import growth rates for all products not so integrated (i.e., that remain under restraint) will be
increased in each of the three intervals between stages by 16 percent, 25 percent and 27
percent, respectively; 20
*  each of the four groups into which the spectrum of textile products has been divided (tops
and yams, fabrics, made up textile products, clothing) must be included in each of the
integration.
The percentages listed in the first bullet above apply to "the total volume of the
Member's  1990 imports of the products in the Annex." l  The annex runs to more than 30 pages
of six-digit HS products and includes all textile and clothing products that were subject to MFA
or MFA-type restraints in at least one importing country. 22 Any one Member is unlikely to have
restraints on all of the products on the list, and hence in the early stages will have the opportunity
to "integrate" products on which it has no restrictions.  As a matter of semantics then, the
operative phrase in the agreement, to integrate into GATT 1994 is better described as "certifying
that a product is clean of restrictions""  than as "removing MFA restrictions."
*  A transitional safeguard measure may be applied by a Member 24 to any product in the Annex,
except for products already integrated into the GATT, i.e., liberalized as per the first bullet
above.
Constraints for using the transitional safeguard mechanism are tighter than those for, say,
the safeguards agreement -e.g.,  a transitional safeguard cannot extend beyond three years.
Transitional safeguards may however be applied against specific exporters.
9 Finger and Harrison (1996) provide a history of MFA-related restrictions on developed economies' imports of
textiles and clothing, beginning with VERs by Japan in the 1930s.
20  The percentages apply  Lo  growth rates, not to growth; e.g., if the agree quota growth rate is 3 percent, in the first
interval this rate must increase to (I .16)x3, equals 3.48.
21 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Article 2, paragraph 6.
22 WTO Secretariat 1999, p. 66.
23 Those that would be illegal under GATT 1994.
24 This includes Members who did not have in place restrictions under the MFA, but who notified the Textiles
Monitoring Board that they retained the right to use the transitional safeguards provision.  Sixty-four
Members so notified. Nine Members notified that they did not wish to retain the right to use transitional
safeguards.(WTO G/L/179, p. 14.)
19IMPLEMENTATION  - CONCENTRATED  ON RELATIVELY  UNRESTRICTED  PRODUCTS
The developed economies' policies toward these imports are among their most restrictive.
Hufbauer and Elliott estimate, for example, that almost 9/10 of the cost to the US economy of
US import restrictions are accounted for by restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing.  At
the same time, textiles and clothing account for more than 20 percent of developing economies'
industrial exports, hence there is much to gain all around from liberalization.
Implementation has proceeded through the first two stages; thus, each importing country
has integrated into GATT 1994 products accounting for at least 33 percent of its imports. There
have been, however, loud complaints that minimal liberalization has resulted from this
implementation.  The most often voiced complaints are that each importing Member has
weighted its liberalization toward products:
*  that were not under restraint in that country,
*  with little value added or on which developed economies do not have comparative advantage,
e.g., yarns and fabrics rather than clothing,
*  with high tariffs,
*  and that they have overused transitional safeguards or have applied antidumping and other
WTO-legal restrictions disproportionally against textiles and clothing.
We will review below available evidence on each of these.
The tabulation in Table TC 1 - taken from information notified to the Textiles Monitoring
Board - does indicate that importers have selected items that were not under restriction.
Norway, of the countries in the table, is the exception. Norway has decided to liberalize more
25 rapidly than the agreement requires.
For the US and Canada (combined) textile imports and clothing imports are about equal,
for Western European countries (combined) clothing imports are considerably larger than textile
imports. 26 Even so, clothing has made up a small part of the products the countries listed in
Table TC2 which have been integrated into GATT 1994 - among the best of them, hardly more
than 10 percent.
TARIFF  CUTS  AND  REMAINING  TARIFFS
Tariffs on textiles and clothing remain high relative to those on industrial products
generally (Table TC3). Table TC3 also reports that the Uruguay Round tariff cuts on textiles and
clothing were relatively large. Not only were the cuts (measured by dT/(1+T) deeper on textiles
and clothing, they were applied to a larger fraction of imports.
TRANSITIONAL  SAFEGUARDS
Table TC4 lists all transitional safeguard measures implemented from implementation of
the Uruguay Round Agreements through March 19, 1999. Soon after the agreement went into
force, the United States applied a number of transitional safeguards, all but one of which had
been lifted by March 1999. The US has not imposed a transitional safeguard since March 1996.
Brazil's actions, all imposed in January 1996, are mostly still in place.  The only other country to
25 WTO document G/C/M/23, p. 23.
26 WTO, Annual Report 1997, Tables IV.53 and IV.60.
20apply a transitional safeguard measure was Colombia, but the two measures applied by Colombia
in 1998 have both been rescinded.
ANTIDUMPING
Table AD6 reports recent antidumping initiations by sector. From these dates it appears
that the EU has initiated a significant number of cases against textile and clothing imports.
These cases however were not on products that the EU liberalized in the first two rounds of
phasing textile and clothing tariff lines into the GATT 1994.
21TABLE  TC1: NUMBERS  OF MFA  QUOTA LIMITS  NOTIFIED  AND  ELIMINATED  IN STAGES  1 AND  2
(Stage 1 plus stage 2 requires integration of 33%, by import volume.)
Notified,  Eliminated
Member  Number  Number  Percentage
United States  650  8  1
European Union  199  14  7
Canada  205  28  14
Norway  54  46  85
Source: WTO Doc. G/L/179, page 29. Norway G/C/M123,  p.23.
TABLE TC2:  CLOTHING AS A PERCENTAGE  BY VOLUME  OF PRODUCTS  INTEGRATED
IN STAGES  1 AND 2
Member  Percentage
United States  12.4
European Union  7.2
Canada  7.9
Norway  10.6
Source: WTO Doc. G/L/179, page 29.
22TABLE TC3: POST  URUGUAY  ROUND APPLIED  TARIFF  RATES  AND URUGUAY  ROUND
TARIFF  CUTS  ON TEXTILES  AND CLOTHING  AND ON ALL  INDUSTRIAL  GOODS
post-UR applied rate  UR cuta  Percentage of imports
dT/(1+T)*  100  subject to cut
Textiles  Industrial  Textiles  Industrial  Textiles  Industrial
And  goods  and  goods  and  goods
_  Clothing  j  clothing  clothing
Selected developed economies
Australia  22.6  9.7  9.0  3.8  54.1  46.2
Canada  14.2  2.6  3.7  1.1  64.8  22.5
European Union  8.7  2.9  1.4  1.3  70.5  43.3
Japan  7.2  1.4  1.9  1.1  83.5  42.1
United States  14.8  3.1  1.7  1.2  86  42.5
Selected developing economies
Brazil  15.5  11.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Colombia  15.9  10.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6
Czech & Slovak
Customs Union  6.6  3.7  1.7  0.9  72.8  72.8
India  42.4  29  I  7.4  6.8  41.1  41.1
Korea  13  7.6  5.1  6.2  71.1  71.1
Thailand  28.9  26.8  19.6  5.4  41.4  41.4
Turkey  44.2  24.2  10.5  2.6  41.7  41.7
Zimbabwe  17.6  4.5  1.3  0.1  2  2
All developed
economies in the IDB  8.4  2.5  1.4  1.0  53.0  32.3
All developing  21.2  13.3  4.1  2.7  48.6  33.4
economies in the IDB
All economies in the  9.8  4.2  1.6  1.3  52.6  32.4
IDB
Note:
a Averaged over all textiles and clothing tariff lines, including those with zero cuts.
23TABLE TC4: TRANSITIONAL  SAFEGUARDS  IN TEXTILES  AND CLOTHING  SINCE 1/95
Member  Member  Measure  Type of  Follow-up of  measure still in
requesting  subject to  Product  introduced  safeguard  Review by  the TMB  force (on
consultations request for  on  measure  the TMB  review  19.03.1999)
consultation  introduced
United States  El Salvador  Cotton & man-made  27.03.95  Agreed  United States rescinded  no
fiber pajamas & other  restraint
nightwear
United States  Honduras  Cotton & man-made  27.03.95  Unilateral  Yes  United States  no
fiber pajamas & other  restraint  rescinded
nightwear
United States  Jamaica  Cotton & man-made  27.03.95  Agreed  United States rescinded  no
fiber pajamas & other  restraint
nightwear
United States  Costa Rica  Cotton & man-made  27.03.95  Unilateral  Yes  Dispute  no
fiber underwear  restraint  settlement
panel
United States  Dominican  Cotton & man-made  27.03.95  Agreed  Yes  no
Republic  fiber underwear  restraint
United States  El Salvador  Cotton & man-made  27.03.95  Agreed  Yes  no
fiber underwear  restraint
24Table TC4: Transitional Safeguards... (continued)
Member  Member  Measure  Type of  Follow-up of  measure still in
requesting  subject to  Product  introduced safeguard  Review by  the TMB  force (on
consultations  request for  on  measure  the TMB  review  19.03.1999)
consultation  introduced
United States  Honduras  Cotton & man-made  27.03.95  Unilateral  Yes  Subsequent  no
fiber underwear  restraint  agreed
restraint,
reviewed
United States  Turkey  Cotton & man-made  28.03.95  Unilateral  Agreed  Agreed  no




United States  Colombia  Cotton & man-made  29.03.95  Agreed  Yes  no
fiber underwear  restraint
United States  Thailand  Cotton & man-made  29.03.95  Unilateral  United States rescinded  no
fiber underwear  restraint  during review
United States  India  Woven wool shirts and  18.04.95  Unilateral  Yes  Dispute  no
blouses  restraint  settlement
panel
United States  India  Women's and girl's wool  18.04.95  Unilateral  Yes  no




action in pursuance of
decision to establish a
_panel
25Table TC4: Transitional Safeguards... (continued)
Member  Member  Measure  Type of  Follow-up of  measure still in
requesting  subject to  Product  introduced safeguard  Review by  the TMB  force (on
consultations  request for  on  measure  review  19.03.1999)
consultation  introduced  the  TMB
United States  India  Men's & boys' wool  18.04.95  Unilateral  Yes  United States  no
coats other than suit-type  restraint  rescinded
United States  Honduras  Women's and girls' wool  24.04.95  Unilateral  Agreed restraint during  no
coats  restraint  review
United States  Philippines  Man-made fiber luggage  24.04.95  Unilateral  Rescinded before review  no
restraint
United States  Brazil  Men's & boys' wool  26.04.95  None  no
coats other than suit-type
United States  Hong Kong  Woven wool shirts and  27.04.95  Unilateral  Yes  United States  no
blouses  restraint  rescinded
United States  Sri Lanka  Man-made fiber luggage  27.04.95  Agreed  United States rescinded  no
restraint
United States  Thailand  Man-made fiber luggage  28.04.95  Unilateral  Rescinded before review  no
restraint
United States  Thailand  Artificial staple yarn  28.04.95  Unilateral  Agreed restraint reviewed  no
restraint
United States  Guatemala  Cotton and man-made  31.05.95  Agreed  Agreed restraint reviewed  no
fiber skirts  restraint
United States  Colombia  Women's and  girls' wool  31.05.95  Agreed  Agreed restraint reviewed  no
suits  restraint
26Table TC4: Transitional Safeguards... (continued)
Member  Member  Measure  Type of  Follow-up of  measure still in
requesting  subject to  Product  introduced safeguard  Review by  the TMB  force (on
consultations  request for  on  measure  the TMB  review  19.03.1999)
consultation  introduced
United States  Philippines  Women's and  girls' wool  31.05.95  Unilateral  Rescinded before review  no
suits  restraint
United States  Costa Rica  Cotton & man-made  29.06.95  Unilateral  Rescinded before review  no
fiber pajamas & other  restraint
nightwear
United States  El Salvador  Cotton & man-made  29.03.96  Unilateral  Agreed restraint before  yes
fiber skirts  restraint  review
United States  Pakistan  Yarn for sale, 85% or  not  no
more by weight cotton  introduced
ring spun
Brazil  Hong Kong  Woven artificial filament  01.06.96  Unilateral  Yes  Brazil  no
fabric  restraint  rescinded
Brazil  Hong Kong  M&B shirts, knitted or  01.06.96  Unilateral  Yes  Brazil  no
crocheted, of other  restraint  rescinded
textile material
Brazil  Korea  Woven fabric containing  01.06.96  Unilateral  Agreed restraint before  yes
85% or more by weight  restraint  deferred review
artificial staple
Brazil  Korea  Woven artificial filament  01.06.96  Unilateral  Agreed restraint before  yes
fabric  restraint  deferred review
Brazil  Korea  Polyester filament fabric  01.06.96  Unilateral  Agreed restraint before  yes
restraint  deferred review
27Table TC4:  Transitional Safeguards... (continued)
Member  Member  Measure  Type of  Follow-up of  measure still in
requesting  subject to  Product  introduced safeguard  Review by  the TMB  force (on
consultations request for  on  measure  the TMB  review  19.03.1999)
consultation  introduced  I
Brazil  Korea  Other synthetic filament  01.06.96  Unilateral  Agreed restraint before  yes
fabric  restraint  deferred review
Brazil  Korea  Sheeting of staple  01.06.96  Unilateral  Agreed restraint before  yes
filament fiber  restraint  deferred review
combinations
Colombia  Brazil  Denim  17.07.98  Unilateral  Yes  Colombia  no
restraint  rescinded
Colombia  India  Denim  17.07.98  Unilateral  Yes  Colombia  no
restraint  rescinded
Source:  Reports  of the Textiles  Monitoring  Body of the WTO
284.  AGRICULTURE
The agriculture negotiations focused on three categories of policy; import restrictions,
domestic support programs, and export subsidy programs.  We will pay attention principally to
import restrictions.
THE INTENT OF THE NEGOTIATORS
On import restrictions, the major objective of the agreement is to establish a "tariffs only"
regime - to eliminate all forms of import restriction other than bound tariff rates. To do so, all
members were required to "tariffy" their non-tariff import restrictions.  This conversion was
based on the price gap methodology, with the methodological details being set out in technical
guidelines on how to measure the gap between the domestic price (the price inside the protection
wall) and the world price. 27 The base period for the conversion, members agreed, would be
1986-1988, a period when many agricultural prices had been unusually low. Because agricultural
policies try to maintain a relatively stable - and high - domestic price, the price gap calculated
from this base period coupled, in some cases, with other adjustments allowed by the technical
guidelines, frequently resulted in high tariff rates. Developing countries had the option to submit
ceiling rates on previously unbound tariff items, with the additional proviso to remove all
agriculture-specific non-tariff measures. Each member's  legal obligation is defined by its
schedule of tariff rates annexed to the GATT 1994.28
According to the WTO Secretariat, forty countries participated in the tariffication process
which covered (in aggregate) about 22 percent of their tariff lines.2 9 Finger-Ingco-Reincke
calculations over the IDB show that tariffication covered, by value, just over one-third of tariffying
countries' agriculture imports.
The modalities document also gave targets for tariff reductions.  A developed country
member was to reduce its duties, including those resulting from tariffication, across all
agricultural tariff lines by a simple average of 36 percent over six years, with a minimum
reduction of 15 percent on individual products.  A developing country member was to reduce its
duties by 24 percent over 10 years, and least developed countries were not required to make
reductions. 3 0
27 Following their use to establish the draft schedules of concessions and commitments, the technical guidelines were
re-issued as Uruguay Round document MTM.GNG/MA/W/24, Modalities For The Establishment Of
Specific Binding Commitments Under The Reform Program, December 20, 1993.
28 The reader should be careful to recognize the difference between the negotiating process through which legal
commitments are agreed and the legal commitments themselves.  The conversion guidelines were part of the
negotiating process.  They likely influenced what tariff rates one Member was willing to accept from another,
but once a Member's schedule of rates was accepted and annexed to GATT 1994, the conversions guidelines
became irrelevant.  No Member can be taken to the dispute settlement mechanism on its bound rates being
higher than those calculated with the formulas of the conversion guidelines.
29WTO Secretariat (1999), p. 136.
30 Again the schedules of commitments, not the formula, define legal obligations.
29Tariff  quota commitments
As part of the tariffication package, WTO Members agreed to maintain, for tariffied
products, "current" import access opportunities at levels corresponding to those existing during
the 1986-88 base period at terms not less favorable than in that period.  Where such current
access had been less than 5 per cent of domestic consumption of the product in question in the
base period, the agreement required an (additional) minimum access opportunity on a most-
favored nation basis 31 at a low tariff rate.  This was to ensure that in 1995, current and minimum
access opportunities combined represented at least 3 per cent of base-period consumption and are
progressively expanded to reach 5 per cent of that consumption in the year 2000 (developed
countries) or 2004 (developing countries), respectively. 32
ESTIMATING  HOW THE  AGREEMENT  HAS CHANGED MARKET  ACCESS
Implementing the tariff part of the agreement involves the following steps:
* As explained above, Convert to tariffs-only,
i.e., determine new tariff rates for all tariff lines with NTBs, eliminate the NTBs.
(Many of the new rates are specific rates, not ad valorem rates.)
. Bind all tariff lines - those on which NTBs have been converted to tariffs and those, on
which there were tariffs only, i.e., no NTBs.
* Reduce the bound rates.
legal commitments are those specified in the schedules of rates attached by Members,
possibly higher - even including staged reductions - than the tariff equivalent of initial measures.
The Finger-Ingco-Reincke calculations that we report here are based on work by Ingco (1995) that
used 1986-1988 as the base period for calculating (a) the ad valorem equivalents of overall
protection applied in that period, and (b) the ad valorem equivalents of the tariffied bound rates.
Ingco found that many of the new bound rates were above the rates actually applied in the
base period, and that some of the post-Uruguay Round bound rates - the rates that incorporate all
of the scheduled reductions - are above the tariff equivalents of all protection applied before the
Uruguay Round.  While the focus of the Finger-Ingco-Reincke calculations we report here is on
isolating the instances in which the Uruguay Round schedules do imply a reduction of protection,
we will pay attention to her evidence on this "dirty tariffication."
Suppose for example, that the ad valorem equivalent rates for a particular tariffied line, as
of the base period, were as follows:
Base period applied protection  20%
(including the tariff equivalent of NTBs)
Immediate post UR bound rate  30%
Final post UR bound rate that  18%
incorporates the scheduled reductions
31 Importers  can however  count special  arrangements  as part of their  minimum  access  commitments  and can allocate
their minimum access to exporters that have special arrangements. Thus sugar, beef etc., imports of the US
and the European Union will be allocated as before.  (Hathaway and Ingco, 1996,  p. 48).
32 Again, legal commitments are defined by the schedules, which specify at which quantities the higher tariff rate
will go into effect.
30In this instance, the Finger-Ingco-Reincke calculations would take as the "before-UR"
rate the 20% applied rate, not the 30 % bound rate. Only if the final-UR bound rate is below the
"before-UR" applied rate does the country's Uruguay Round commitment imply a tariff
reduction. Thus the "after-UR" rate in the Finger-Ingco-Reincke calculations is the lower of the
"before-UR" rate or the post-UR bound rate.
The guideline of a 36 percent reduction is met in this example - the reduction of the
bound rate from 30% to 18% is more than a 36 percent reduction.  The Finger-Ingco-Reincke
calculations, however, look at how the Uruguay Round has reduced applied protection, and
would include only the reduction from the previously applied rate, i.e., from 20%, to 18%. If the
final-UR bound rate were at or above the base period applied rate - in this example, at or above
20%, the Finger-Ingco-Reincke calculations would attribute zero reduction to the Uruguay
Round. 33
RESULTS:  TARIFF  BINDINGS  AND  REDUCTIONS
Judging from the sample of countries in the IDB, Table Al reports that both developed
and developing economies have now bound virtually 100 percent of their agricultural tariff lines,
overall an expansion of coverage of about two-thirds for the developing economies, one-fourth
for the developed economies.  Uruguay Round adjustments imply reductions of tariff rates on
about one-fourth of developed economies' imports, on about one-fifth of developing economies'
imports.  The developing economies were expected to make smaller cuts, but our results show a
larger depth of cut for developing economies. 34
The figures for scope and depth of cut by the developing economies in the IDB, are
probably not representative of developing economies in general.  The IDB covers all of the
developed economy members of the WTO, but it covers none of the least developed countries,
who were not expected to make reductions of their agricultural tariffs.  The developing
economies in the IDB tend to be those that have implemented significant trade reforms.
Chart Al  converts the extent and depth of tariff cuts by the developing economies into
multiples of performance by the developed economies.  We see there the same pattern we found
for tariffs overall.  Developing economies' tariffs are still considerably above those of developed
economies; the extent (import coverage) of developing economies' Uruguay Round tariff
reductions was smaller.  But the depth of cut when we measure by how it will affect trading
partners' market access was considerably more by the developing economies - at least for those
who are in the IDB.
Tariff quota commitments
The above figures do not take into account how the minimum access commitments
(implemented through tariff quotas) have affected the scope of liberalization.  This impact
depends, of course, on which of a country's tariffied products have imports below 5 percent of
33 The "after" rate is always  the lower  of the applied  and the post-UR  bound  rate;  hence,  the Uruguay  Round
reduction  is never  negative.
34 Developing  economies'  tariff rates  tend to be higher  (Table  A2), we  measure  the depth of tariff cut by dT/(l+T) -
which  for a given dT/T is larger  as T is larger. Negotiating  guidelines  were not precise,  but in GATT/WTO
affairs,  dT/T is usually  the implicit  measure  for depth  of cut.
31base period domestic consumption, and by how much. 35 At the maximum (i.e., if imports of all
tariffied products were below the minimum) minimum access opportunities would affect the 22
percent of tariff lines, or approximately one-third of imports, by value, that were tariffied.
Hathaway and Ingco (1996, p. 49) estimate that Japan and Korea's minimum access
commitments on rice will result in nearly a million tons per year of new imports, an expansion of
world trade in rice of 7.5 percent over its 1992 level.  Otherwise, they conclude that "the
minimum access commitments will provide relatively little additional access and even less
additional trade," no more that 0.5 percent for wheat and sugar. (pp. 48, 49)
TARIFFICATION ABOVE EXISTING LEVELS OF PROTECTION
On agriculture products as on manufactures, developing economies committed to ceiling
bindings above their applied rates.  Averaged over the developing economies in the IDB, the
average applied rate in the base period was 18 percent, their bound rates average almost 60
percent.
Countries that converted NTBs to tariffs have in some cases posted rates higher than the
base year tariff equivalent of those NTBs. Japan, for example, has announced that beginning in
April 1999 its tariff on rice will be $3.05 per kilo.  International Trade Reporter (1998) estimates
that this rate is equivalent to 1,000 percent, ad valorem.  This rate applies, of course, only to
imports in excess of Japan's minimum access comiitment.  Hathaway and Ingco calculate that
Japan's actual base period protection on rice had a tariff equivalent of about 650 percent. 36
Ingco identifies other instances in which a developed economy's post-UR bound rate is above
the tariff equivalent of its base year protection.
SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS
The provision on special safeguards applies only to products that were subject to
tariffication. They allow additional duties to be applied in case of a precisely defined surge of
import quantity, or cases of imports at prices below a precisely defined reference level. A
member can apply a special safeguard to a product for the remainder of the relevant year, on a
shipment by shipment basis, only if the member noted in its schedule of commitments that it
claimed the right to (eventually) do so.  Thirty-eight members have reserved that right, on
varying numbers of products.  For all relevant Members combined, these reservations imply a
potential for imposing special safeguards on almost 6,100 tariff items.  During the period January
1998 through September 1998, volume-based actions were taken by five Members affecting a
total of 128 tariff items and price-based actions were also taken by five Members affecting a total
of 72 tariff items.
35 The commitments apply to opportunities, as defined by the volume at which the higher tariff quota rate applies.
They are not minimum import commitments.
36 The specific duty is above the domestic cost of production, hence only the minimum access cornmitment will
affect the amount of rice Japan imports.
32TABLE  Al:  AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS:  URUGUAY  ROUND  TARIFF  BINDINGS
Percent of imports  Post-UR bindings
GATT-bound  that reduce
Pre-UR  Post-UR  protectiona
Tariffied products
All economies that tariffied  66  100  14
Untariffied products
Developed Economies  |  71  100  35
Developing Economies  37  100  17
Tariffied and untariffied products
Developed Economies  72  100  26
Developing Economies  37  100  17
Notes:
a Tariffied products: percentage (by value) of imports with fmal-UR bound rates (rates that include
reductions) below the tariff equivalent of base period protection.  Untariffied products: percentage of
imports with fmal-UR bound rates below base period applied rates.
Source: Finger-lngco-Reincke, Tables G2.
33TABLE A2: AVERAGE  URUGUAY  ROUND  TARIFF CUTS ON AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS,
AVERAGE  POST-URUGUAY  ROUND  APPLIED  AND  BOUND  TARIFF  LEVELS
UR  post-UR  post-UR bound
|Reductiona  applied rateb  rateb
Tariffied  Lines
All economies  that  4.4  25  32
tariffied
Not tariffied  lines
Developed  Economies  1.6  5  7
Developing  Economies  0.9  19  66
Tariffied  and not tariffied
Developed  Economies  1.5  14  15
Developing  Economies  4.7  18  60
Notes:
a Change measured as dT/(l+T), expressed as a percentage. Tariffied products: change from the tariff
equivalent of base period protection to final-UR bound rate.  Untariffied products: change from base
period applied rate to the lower of base period applied rate and final-UR bound rate.
Ad valorem equivalent based on 1986-1988 prices.
Source: Finger-Ingco-Reincke, Tables G2.
34CHART  Al:  COMPARISONS  OF EXTENT  AND DEPTH  OF UR TARIFF  CONCESSIONS  ON
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355.  ANTIDUMIPING
The Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement (formally, Agreement on Implementation
of Article VI of the GATT 1994) adds considerable detail, e.g.:
*  specificity has been added on the required evidence and methodology for determining
dumping and injury,
*  rules regarding support from domestic industry of the antidumping claim are now spelled out,
*  procedural rules for hearing both sides and the time frame of investigations have been
tightened,
*  a "de minimis" clause (specifying that the dumping margin has to be at least 2 percent) have
been added,
*  notification requirements are explicit,
*  a sunset clause and requirement for review have been added.
DEVELOPING  ECONOMIES  BECOME  MAJOR  USERS
The use of antidumping has spread significantly from the five original industrial country
users (Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand and the US).  In a first wave, a number of
advanced developing countries including Mexico, Brazil and Argentina starting using
antidumping in the late 1980s. More recently, many smaller and poorer developing countries
have sporadically taken recourse to antidumping, so that the total number of countries which
have used this means of trade protection now exceeds 30.  The use of antidumping per dollar of
imports is notably higher among developing economies than among developed economies.
Among the traditional users of antidumping, the number of initiations has declined since
the Uruguay Round Agreements have been in effect, i.e., since January 1, 1995. The filing of a
number of antidumping cases by the US steel industry at the time of this writing (March 1999)
may however reverse the decline in the United States. Among new users, for which data are
available - Argentina, Mexico, Korea and Turkey report an increase in the number of tariff lines
the trade covered by antidumping measures. Among the developing economies for which data
are available, only Brazil applies antidumping measures to a declining share of tariff lines
(Michalopoulos, 1999). Table AD1 along with Charts ADI and AD2 illustrate the development
of antidumping investigations over the 1991-98 period.
Table AD2 contains the countries most frequently affected by antidumping cases between
1992-94 and 1995-97. China has been targeted most frequently during both periods.  The United
States, one of the most frequent users of antidumping, is also one of the most targeted countries,
second after China and targeted more than twice as often as Japan.  After China and the US,
Korea and Brazil were the main targets during the early 1990s; while Korea, Germany and
Taiwan attracted the most investigations in the latter period.  Industrial countries mostly target
other high income and transition countries, with less than one quarter of the investigations
involving developing countries (and about half of those, China).  Developing countries by
contrast initiate an almost equal share of investigations against either of the three country groups
(Miranda, Torres and Ruiz, 1998). As to sectoral distribution, we find that producers of base
metals, chemicals, machinery, electrical equipment, plastics and textiles frequently seek
antidumping protection.
36UNDERTAKINGS,  MAGNITUDE  OF ANTIDUMPING MEASURES
The share of initiated investigations (Table AD3) that lead to a restrictive outcome
(provisional measures and affirmative findings) tend to be similar among all the countries in the
table - except Australia, where the proportion of cases there that lead to restrictive outcomes,
particularly restrictive final outcomes, is notably below the figure for any other country.
Another important dimension of such protection is the use of price undertakings
(exporters agreeing to maintain minimum export prices) versus tariffs. For lack of time-series
data, we did a tabulation for seven of the main antidumping users for 1997. In this year, only
Korea and the EU report a significant share of final measures being price undertakings (Table
AD4).  In Korea this share exceeds 50 percent, and in the EU 20 percent.  In the other 5 countries
for which data was readily available, 98-100 percent of final measures consisted of duties.
While the trade coverage of antidumping is small, the level of tariffs applied on average
is quite high and has in some instances reached several hundred percent.  The last column of
Table AD4 provides average duties imposed as part of final measures in the same seven users in
1997. Colombia applies the highest average tariff of 60 percent and Korea the lowest of 28
percent.  Four of the other countries apply average rates of 30 to 40 percent.  This is very high
compared to "normal" average tariffs of about 4 percent on industrial products in developed
economies, 8 percent to 12 percent in developing economies.  The EU's 40 percent for 1997 are
also much higher than the 23 percent applied for the 1980-87 period (Messerlin, 1989).
Because of the sunset clause in the Uruguay Round Agreement, reviews of measures
already in place make up an increasing share of investigations. In the EU, 79 out of 190
investigations have been reviews in the 1995 - 1998 period, in the US 116 reviews of measures
in place when the Uruguay Round agreements came into effect were conducted in 1998.
WTO DISPUTES OVER ANTIDUMPING  CASES
A variety of disputes regarding procedures, standards for initiating and conducting
investigations, as well as substantive elements necessary for imposing duties are emerging.  The
recent dispute between Guatemala and Mexico on Portland cement has illustrated that the
procedural and technical requirements to conduct an antidumping investigation consistent with
WTO rules are quite stringent.  Many developing countries are likely to find it difficult to meet
these requirements and may find themselves increasingly challenged, especially by the high-
income countries.  Developing economies have not been reluctant to challenge antidumping
actions by the developed economies: Korea's case against the US on D-Ram and India's dispute
with the EU on unbleached cotton fibers are examples.
The real test of the use or abuse of antidumping, however, may still be lying ahead. In
recent years, the world economic climate has been quite favorable, and previous studies have
shown that the use of antidumping is strongly correlated with the business cycles (see, e.g.,
Leidy, 1996). The slowdown in economic growth since the outbreak of the Asian crisis could,
with a lag, lead to a rebound in antidumping measures and more retreats in market access
commitments.  The saber-rattling in the US and the considerable increase in cases by several
countries in 1998 are, we hope, a transitory phenomenon.
37ANTIDUMPING  AS AFFECTED  BY THE  ASIAN CRISIS
One could hypothesize that the Asian crisis would change the pattern of user and target
countries for antidumping.  As to the Asian countries affected, each experienced a marked
currency devaluation, which is likely to reduce import competition and hence pressures for
protection.  Consistent with this, we found that the five Asian countries affected by crisis
initiated fewer new cases but became the target of investigations more often in 1998 as compared
to 1997. Korea and Malaysia which had used antidumping to a moderate extent in 1996/97
almost stopped initiating new investigations in 1998. Indonesia continued using antidumping to
some degree while Thailand and the Philippines had never been very active users.
As to antidumping initiations against the Asian crisis countries, there is no uniform
development although some increase has probably taken place.  The US and South Africa
increased the number of antidumping investigations against South East Asia from 2 to 6 and
from 2 to 9 respectively.  The European Union, on the other hand, initiated only 4 new cases in
1998 (all of them against Korea) after 10 cases in 1997. Brazil and Mexico neither used
antidumping in 1997 nor in 1998 against these countries. (Table AD5)
ANTIDUMPING  CASES IN SECTORS  WITH NOTABLE LIBERALIZATION
It could be hypothesized that sectors with disproportionately large liberalization would
also report a stronger increase in antidumping cases since the end of the Uruguay Round.
However, there is little evidence of this for four of the main user countries.  In India use of
antidumping has jumped since the end of the Uruguay Round, but it is not obvious that there is a
correlation between new antidumping cases and sectoral liberalization. Disproportionate
liberalization in wood products (EU, Australia) and in textiles/clothing/footwear (EU) may be
responsible for an increase in antidumping claims in these two sectors. (Table AD6)
38TABLE ADl:  ANTIDUMPING INITIATIONS BY ECONOMY  TAKING ACTION
Number of antidumping initiations  Index of antidumping
Economy  initiations per dollar
1991-94  1995-98  of imports,
USA=1OO  a/
Developed Economies
Australia  213  77  1096
Canada  84  39  199
EU  135  122  210
us  226  94  100
All developed  678  353  74
economies
Developing Economies
Argentina  59  72  2627
Brazil  59  54  871
India  15  78  1875
Korea  14  34  204
Mexico  127  31  275
South Africa  16  72  2324
All developing  394  509  313
economies
Notes:
a-/  Based  on numbers  of antidumping  initiations  1995-98  and  values  of merchandise  imports  for 1996.
bl  1995-97  figure.
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division; Antidumping Measures Database
39TABLE AD2: ANTIDUMPING  INITIATIONS  BY EXPORTING  ECONOMY
Number of antidumping initiations  Index of antidumping
Economy  initiations per dollar
1992-94  1995-97  of exports, USA=100
Developed economies
France  26  834
Germany  35  30  70
Italy  16  1677
Japan  32  23  67
UK  20  16  74
US  70  48  100
Developing economies
Brazil  50  23  585
China  115  94  751
India  24  21779
Korea  50  40  385
Taiwan  31  30  323
Thailand  26  21  451
40TABLE  AD3:  SHARE  OF COMPLETED  INVESTIGATIONS  RESULTING  IN
PROVISIONAL  AND  DEFINITIVE  MEASURES,  1987-1997
Number of  Proportion  Proportion
Completed  provisional  affirmative
Investigations  measures  outcome
United States  423  83  64
Canada  186  83  63
EC  308  55  60
Korea  43  58  58
New Zealand  54  39  57
Mexico  182  63  53
Argentina  94  48  51
Brazil  75  41  43
South Africa  62  48  42
Australia  408  53  29
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division; Antidumping Measures Database
41TABLE AD4: ANTIDUMPING  DUTIES  VS. PRICE  UNDERTAKINGS,  1997
Share of  Share of  Average duty
affirmative  affirmative
decisions  decisions ending  in 1997
ending in duty  in price
undertakings
(in  %)  (in  %)
Canada  98.0  2.0  34.1
Colombia  100.0  0.0  60.3
EC  79.5  20.5  40.4
Korea  46.7  53.3  27.9
Mexico  100.0  0.0  53.7
South Africa  100.0  0.0  34.1
US  99.4  0.6  30.5
Source: WTO Rules Division; Antidumping Measures Database
a/ In percent; average all final measures per country in 1997; when a decision ended in a range of
duties, the mean value was taken.
42TABLE AD5: ANTIDUMPING INITIATIONS AGAINST SOUTH-EAST  ASIAN COUNTRIES IN 1997 AND 1998
Korea  Indonesia  Thailand  Philippines  Malaysia  Total
1997  1998  1997  1998  1997  1998  1997  1998  1997  1998  1997  1998
EU  4  4  1  0  2  0  0  0  3  0  10  4
US  2  4  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  6
Brazil  0  0  0  0  O  O  0  0  0  0  0  0
India  1  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  2  3
Mexico  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
South Africa  2  5  1  1  0  0  0  0  1  3  4  9
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division; Antidumping Measures Database
43TABLE AD6:  ANTIDUMPING  CLAIMS  BY SECTORS  WITH  ABOVE  AVERAGE  LIBERALIZATION,
SELECTED  COUNTRIES
1992  1993  P  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
United States
metals  68  15  33  4  8  11  13
chemicals  9  12  7  0  6  0  0
other manufacturing  0  2  2  0  0  0  0
textiles/clothing  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
European Union
wood  1  0  0  1  0  7  0
metals  9  5  10  7  11  3  15
chemicals  13  5  6  3  0  6  0
machinery  13  7  4  10  0  14  0
other manufacturing  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
textiles/cloth/footwear  1  1  17  6  10  8  6
India
wood  T  0  0  3  0  0  ...
text/clothing  0  0  0  3  0  9  ...
metals  0  0  3  0  3  3  ...
chemicals  1  5  2  1  4  8  ...
machinery  0  0  0  8  0  6
Australia
wood  0  8  0  °  0  14  1
metals  2  3  2  |  O  2  0
machinery  2  4  0  1  1  1  0









1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Proj.
Source: WTO Rules Division; Antidumping Measures database







46SUBSIDIES,  COUNTERVAILING  DUTIES
Like the antidumping rules, the GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing duties were
superseded by a comprehensive Uruguay Round Agreement.  The Subsidy Agreement
distinguishes three types of subsidies.  Subsidies contingent upon export performance or on the
use of domestic over imported inputs are prohibited. They can lead to both countervailing duties
and a dispute settlement case. Subsidies not specific to an enterprise or industry are considered
"non-actionable."  They can not be subject to countervailing duties or dispute settlement
challenges although they can be brought to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures if they result in serious adverse effects in another country. All other subsidies are
"actionable", i.e., they may be subject to multilateral dispute settlement challenge or to
countervailing action if they adversely effect another WTO Member.
Industrial countries had to phase out prohibited subsidies by 1998. Least developed
countries have until 2003 to eliminate subsidies contingent on the use of domestic inputs, but are
not required to eliminate export subsidies.  Other developing countries must eliminate subsidies
contingent on the use of domestic inputs by 2000, export subsidies by 2003. Special Provisions
for transition economies are more complex, involving a requirement that prohibited subsidies be
phased out by 2002, but at the same time providing some lee way to apply programs and
measures necessary for transformation from a centrally-planned to a market, free-enterprise
economy.
Like in antidumping, the subsidy agreement added considerable specificity on procedures
and criteria for a countervailing duty investigation. The agreement also requires that countries
notify their specific subsidies (as defined under the Subsidy Agreement) on an annual basis, and
countervailing duty activities on a semi-annual basis.
USE OF COUNTERVAILING  DUTIES
There are two notable developments in the use of countervailing duties:
*  Overall use has declined considerably since the end of the Uruguay Round, with much of this
decline due to the absence of steel cases,
*  The EU has become a user of countervailing measures since 1996 after hardly having used
this instrument before.
The 1992 to 1994 period saw 137 cases with the US, Australia, Brazil and Mexico being
the principal users (Table CV 1). The European Community and its individual members, Brazil
and South Africa were the main targets of countervailing duty cases for that period.  Since the
Uruguay Round agreements have come into force, the number of initiations has declined
drastically. The 1995-1997 period witnessed only 33 cases, one quarter of the cases during the
preceding 3 years.  Apart from the US, the EU and New Zealand have become the main users of
this provision, with EU countries and South Africa remaining the main targets (Table CV2).
Although 1998 data are incomplete at the time of this writing, there are indications that the
number of cases will be near the annual rates of 1992-95; considerably higher than the low rates
in 1995-97.
Data on the trade coverage of countervailing cases is very limited.  The US reports that
cases initiated over the past 10 years (1988-1997) affected only 0.7 percent of total US imports.
This is a decline by 50 percent compared to the 1984-94 period, when 1.4 percent of imports
were affected (US ITC, 1998). We mentioned above that the EU does not report trade coverage
47of countervailing cases separately from antidumping. However, given that the first EU
countervailing case of the 1990s was brought about in 1996 and only 9 cases were reported for
1996/98, trade coverage should be very small.  The 4 cases from 1998, for example, affected
trade of US$ 140 million.
Data on the share of decisions leading to duties versus undertakings and on the average
tariff rates are also scarce, but available data for two countries suggest that countervailing duties
are much lower than antidumping duties.  New Zealand reports two decisions leading to duties
and price undertakings, each with an average duty of 7.5 percent.  The US notified over 80
percent of decisions leading to duties, and average tariffs only average 4.2 percent.
There were a number of conflicts over the application of the Subsidy Agreement and the
use of countervailing duties during the 1995-98 period. With respect to multilateral challenges
to subsidies applied by Members, the only adopted dispute settlement panel report (by March
1999) in this area on Indonesia's national car program was decided in favor of the plaintiff, the
EU.  However, a number of other subsidies panels are ongoing as of this writing, mostly dealing
with subsidies that the plaintiff interprets to be in the prohibited category.  There are also in
process a number of cases on the application of countervailing measures.
Notifications regarding subsidies and countervailing duties seem to be provided relatively
regularly.  However, developing countries report subsidy data much less frequently, and all
subsidy notifications are frequently late and incomplete.
There are no firm plans for new negotiations in this area, but some challenges remain.
Given the upcoming deadlines to bring Members' subsidy schemes in line with WTO rules, there
is considerable concern about developing and transition countries' ability to meet these deadlines.
48TABLE  CV1:  NUMBERS  OF INITIATIONS  OF COUNTERVAILING  DUTY INVESTIGATIONS,  BY
INITIATING  MEMBER
Number of initiations
Country  by country
1992-94  1995-97
Argentina  4  3
Australia  19  1
Brazil  23  0
Canada  2  3
Chile  8  0
EU  0  5
Mexico  16  1
New Zealand  0  6
USA  60  10
Other  5  4
Total  137  33
Source: WTO Secretariat, Rules Division; Countervailing Measures Database
49TABLE CV2: NUMBERS  OF INITIATIONS  OF COUNTERVAILING  DUTY INVESTIGATIONS,  BY
AFFECTED  (EXPORTER)  MEMBER
Number of initiations
Country  against country
1992-94  1995-97
Brazil  13  1
Canada  4  2
EC  12  5
Germany  6  1
India  4  4
Italy  6  6
South Africa  10  3
US  7  1
Venezuela  5  1
Other  70  9
Total  137  33
Source:  WTO  Secretariat,  Rules  Division;  Countervailing  Measures  Database
506.  SAFEGUARDS
The Agreement  on Safeguards  specifies  the rules for the application  of Article  XIX
emergency  action  measures. Under  the agreement,  action  can be taken against  imports  only a
determination  of "serious"  injury  caused  or threatened  to be caused  by imports. 37 Either
quantitative  restrictions  or duty increases  beyond  bound  rates  are allowed,  but measures  are time
bound  and must be progressively  reduced. The need  to make compensation  and the right of
exporters  to retaliate  can be avoided  by keeping  the restrictive  measure  within certain
parameters.  8 This restriction  on compensation-retaliation  was intended  to make the use of
safeguards  measures  more attractive,  and aims at preventing  the re-emergence  of voluntary
export  restraints  or orderly  marketing  arrangements.  The agreement  also requires  that existing
safeguard  measures  be notified  and phased  out according  a schedule  similar  to the sunset
provision  that applies  to new  measures.
There has been a minor increase  in cases  since  the Uruguay  Round  agreement  came  into
effect,  but safeguards  remain an infrequently  used trade  remedy  - only 19 safeguard
investigations  initiated  1995-97  as compared  with 33 countervailing  duty investigations  and over
600 antidumping  initiations. 39 (Table SG1)
Total  imports  affected  by investigations  amounted  to about 2 billion  US$ between 1995
and 1998,  or about  one quarter of one  percent of annual  imports  of the countries  initiating
investigations. 40 Two of the eight cases  which  have  been decided  affirmatively  resulted  in a
quantitative  restriction,  the other six in tariffs. Import  quotas  were allocated  in both cases  on the
basis of previous  relative  import  shares. Four cases  were terminated  or ended in a negative
decision,  and four decisions  were outstanding  at the time of this writing.
Our findings  on safeguards  confirm  earlier  findings  that market  access  retreats  through
existing  provisions  have so far been limited. At the samne  time,  the new UR Agreements  have
been  successful  in curtailing  protection  outside  the multilateral  framework. Between  1995  and
spring 1999,  there have been no complaints  that the prohibition  of gray area measures  under
Article 11 of the SGA has been violated. Anticipation  that degressive  and time-bound  safeguard
measures  would  replace  antidumping  as an instrument  for dealing  with specific  import  problems
has not been  have been realized.
37 Thereseems  to be a legal consensus that "serious injury" is a somewhat higher level of injury than "material
injury" as specified under antidumping and countervailing duty rules.  The difference is however difficult to
isolate in an accounting or economic sense.
38  conditions are provided in the WTO homepage under www.wto.org/WTO/goods/safeguar.htm.
39 Finger (1998) demonstrates that the various trade remedies the GATT/WTO permits are quite fungible.
40 The five cases by the US covered in total about 0.15 percent of US annual imports, the two cases by Argentina
covered I percent of Argentine imports.
51TABLE  SG1:  SAFEGUARD  INVESTIGATIONS  INITIATIONS,  1991-1998
Country  1991  1992  1993  1994  Total  1995  1996  1997  1998  Total
1991-94  1995-98
Argentina  0  1  1  2
Australia  0  1  1
Austria  1  1  2  0
Brazil  0  1  1
Canada  1  1  0
Czech & Slovak  1  1  0
EEC  3  1  _  _  4  0
Egypt  0  1  1
Hungary  3  3  0
India  0  1  5  6
Korea  0  1  2  3
USA  0  1  2  1  1  5
Allcountries  5  3  3  0  11  2  5  3  9  19
52TABLE SG2: SAFEGUARD MEASURES,  SINCE 1/95
Notifying  Type of Product  Year prior  to  Share of Total  Initiation  of  Outcome  of
Member  concerned  InYesation  Merchandise  Investigation  Injury  Type of Measure  & Quantification  /2
(Million US  I  Imports (%)  (Year)  Investigation
Argentina  Footwear  116.6  0.49  1997  affirmative  Tariff  4.96 $ per pair (average),
4.04 $ per pair (average)
Toys  155.1  0.51  1998  ongoing
Australia  Swinemeat  27.6  0.04  1998  affirmative  ...
Brazil  Toys  133.1  0.25  1996  affirmative  Tariff  43%,29%,15% plus 20% regular tariff
Egypt  Safety matches  1.7  0.01  1998  affirmative  Tariff  34%,22%,1 1% plus 30% regular tariff
India  Acetylene black  ...  ...  1997  affirmative  Tariff  18% up to Re 12,950/metric tonne, 5%
up to Re 8,830/metric tonne /3
Carbon black  24.5  0.07  1998  affirmative  Tariff  10%
Slabstock polyol  13.1  0.04  1998  ongoing
Propylene glycol  3.4  0.01  1998  ongoing
Hardboard  0.2  0.00  1998  negative  None
Styrene butadiene  ...  ...  1998  terminated on  None
rubber  01.05.98
Korea  Soybean oil  ...  ...  1995  affirmative  None
Dairy Products  69.4  0.05  1996  affirmative  Import  rising from 55.6 to 65.2 % of pre-
.______________  Quota  investigation  imports
Bicycles & parts  38.9  0.03  1996  affirmative  None
USA  Tomatoes  191.9  0.03  1995  negative  None
Brooms  12.1  0.00  1996  affirmative  Tariff  33%,32.5%,32.1% from 32% current
bound rate
Tomatoes &  843.1  0.10  1996  negative  None
peppers
Wheat gluten  90.5  0.01  1997  affirmative  QR
Lamb meat  123.5  0.01  1998  ongoing
Total  Average  across
1,844.7  countries
0.24
Source: Notifications submitted by Member Countries to the WTO Committee on Safeguards.
1/ the year closest to the initiation of the investigation was chosen, in most cases this was the year prior to it.
2/ more than one figure for one measure describes the steps of progressive liberalization.
3/ a duty charged up to a maximum of value (Re) per quantity (metric tonnes).
537.  SERVICES
Since  the Uruguay  Round,  the multilateral  trading system  includes  disciplines  and
liberalization  commitments  covering  trade in services. Although  experts  who have  reviewed  the
outcome  of the negotiations  have concluded  that the first round of services  negotiations  did not
result in far-reaching  trade liberalization,  they also point out that  the importance  of bringing
services  under  the multilateral  umbrella  of the WTO should  not be underestimated  (Snape,  1998;
Hoekman,  1996). In most countries,  at least  half of GDP is generated  in the services  sectors and
the share  is increasing. At the same  time less than one quarter  of world trade, as reported in
countries'  balance-of-payments,  is in services;  60 percent  of which  falls under  tourism  and
transport. Low, Mattoo  and Schuknecht  (1999)  show  that trade-openness  in most services
sectors  is still much lower  than in merchandise  trade, and further  technical  progress  and market
opening  could hence create  enormous  new  trading  opportunities.
THE AGREEMENT
The rights  and obligations  of WTO  Members  regarding  services  trade are specified  in the
General  Agreement  on Trade in Services  (GATS). Many GATS  obligations  parallel  those of the
GATT,  although  there are important  structural  differences  between  the two agreements.
National  treatment,  for example  is an unconditional  obligation  under  GATT  but negotiable  under
the GATS.  It applies  only to sectors  that a country  itself specifies  in its schedule  of commitments
and can be made subject  to limitations  even in these  cases. Moreover,  the GATS permits
exempting  measures  from the most-favored-nation  treatment  for limited  periods. 4'  The GATS,
like the GATT,  provides  for the withdrawal  of commitments  for Balance-of-Payment  reasons
(Article  XII), and under  general  exceptions  (Article  XIV). It contains  a broad  carve-out  for
prudential  reasons  in financial  services  (Annex  on Financial  Services)  and establishes  a
framework  for modifications  of schedules  (Article  XXI). In some  areas, negotiations  on the need
for and possible  content  of specific  rules are still ongoing  (see also Croome,  1996  and 1998).
Like the tariff agreements  under  the GATT,  the GATS  provides  no special  monitoring
system  for Members'  compliance  to their commitments.  The small number  of complaints  and
conflicts  brought  to the Services  Committee  and the Dispute  Settlement  Body suggest  that
compliance  is so far not a big problem. Early dispute  settlement  cases have  however  helped to
establish  important  principles. The banana  case against  the European  Union,  for example,
established  that GATS commitments  must not be impaired  indirectly - in the bananas  case,
through  the application  of trade measures  on goods that would  otherwise  be allowed.
LIBERALIZATION
The GATS schedules  of commitments  are structured  along  three dimensions;  (i) sector, 42
(ii) type of commitment  (essentially  market access  and national  treatment),  and (iii)  mode of
supply.  Unlike  the GATT,  the GATS  covers  not only cross-border  trade (mode 1) but also
consumption  abroad  (mode 2), foreign  commercial  presence  (mode 3), and the movement  of
41 Slightly more than half of the WTO membership has used this possibility and annexed MFN exemptions to their
schedules.
42 Members in making commitments for specified sectors usually followed from a nomenclature prepared to
facilitate negotiations.  That nomenclature divides services activities into some 160 sectors.
54natural persons (mode 4).43 GATS commitments are based on a positive list, i.e., apply only to
sectors explicitly listed in schedules. A country that makes a commitment for a sector for a type
of commitment say, national treatment, may however put limitations on that commitment.
Country schedules vary from one page covering one subsector to more than 100 pages covering
most services sectors.  Malaysia, for example, has made commitments in the largest number of
sectors (over 130), and another 30 countries have made commitments in over 100 sub-sectors.
Almost all WTO Members have made commitments in tourism, but only 10 regarding rail
services.
Tables S 1 and S2 present a tally of Members' commitments under the most frequently
used modes of delivery, mode 1 (cross border) and mode 3 (commercial presence).4  The table
lists the numbers of countries that have made national treatment and market access commitments
in the most important service sectors.  The information in Tables SI and S2 is summarized in
Tables S3 and S4.45 We see in Table S3 that across all of the sectors, developing economies
agreed to allow unlimited cross-border market access to foreign sellers in only 8 percent of the
country-sector possibilities.  Developed economies were even less forthcoming, granting full
cross-border access in only 7 percent of the country-sector possibilities.  There are even fewer
unrestricted commitments to allow foreign sales through a foreign commercial presence.
Overall, there were slightly more commitments to allow unqualified national treatment to foreign
sellers.
While Table S3 asks how many countries granted unrestrained access to foreign sellers,
Table S4 asks how many countries granted at least some access, e.g., allowed foreign
commercial presence but limited the size of the foreign establishment, allowed cross-border
access to some forms of banking deposits but not to others.  By this standards, the Uruguay
Round outcome is more optimistic.  The developed economies accepted some cross border
access in more than 2/3 of the instances, and agreed to allow some form of foreign commercial
presence in almost all sectors.  Developing economy commitments were more restricted,
allowing some form of cross-border market access in about 1/4 of instances, allowing some
foreign commercial presence and some dimensions of national treatment for foreign
establishments in about 1/3 of the tabulated instances.
The obvious message is that the agreement provides a substantial start toward opening
international markets for services, but nearly all liberalization commitments are qualified in
some way, especially commitments by developing economies.
43  Examples: tourist travel abroad (mode 2), buying an insurance policy from a foreign-owned but domestically
established branch office (mode 3), and the temporary contract for a business consultant abroad (mode 4).
Trade statistics comparing trade across modes are limited and it is often difficult to pin down just what
available statistics describe.  Based on information available for the US, mode 3 trade (sales by foreign
branches of US companies) in financial, insurance and recreational services is considerably larger than mode
1 trade (purchases by foreigners from a US-located source).  In business services, trade in the two modes is
about equal.  Only in telecom services does mode I trade - trade across borders - appear to be larger than the
corresponding mode 3 trade (Low, Mattoo and Schuknecht, 1999).
44 Mode 2 appears less important in many areas (except tourism) and commitments there often mirrors mode 1
commitments.  Mode 4 (movement of natural persons) commitments are very limited for all countries.
45 As to how the summary tables were constructed, the category "Professional Services" in Tables SI and S2
includes four sectors.  Our tabulation covers 105 developing economies and 26 developed economies, hence
in Table S3 in the first line, there were a possible total of (a) 105 developing economies times 4 sectors, or
420 access commitments by developing economies and of (b) 26 developed economies times 4 sectors, or
104 access commitments by developed economies.
55What challenges do these findings pose? Article XIX of the GATS sets January 1, 2000
as the deadline to start new negotiations in services. Given the relatively limited liberalization
commitments, negotiations should focus on improving market access conditions (Croome, 1998).
Liberalization across all sectors, countries and modes should open up considerable new trading
opportunities.
Some further development of GATS rules is already mandated in the Agreement itself,
and more may be necessary. Effective disciplines on domestic regulation as embedded in
professional qualifications, licensing requirements, and technical standards may also be an
important issue to prevent such measures from being unnecessarily trade distortive.
Furthermore, regulatory principles aiming at effective competition and independent regulatory
oversight as agreed for the basic telecom sector, could be a precedent for other sectors where
previous monopolies are gradually exposed to competition.
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that the trade potential in services is not only
constrained by trade policies in many developing countries. A weak services infrastructure and
problems in identifying export opportunities can also be a severe obstacle to services trade
development. Nevertheless, it is likely that trade liberalization in conjunction with technical
progress (e.g. electronic cornmerce) will much expand services trade and the boundary of what is
tradable in the future (Bacchetta, Low, Mattoo, Schuknecht, Wager and Wehrens, 1998).
56TABLE SI: MODE 1  COMMITMENTS  IN SELECTED  SERVICES  SECTORS
Commitments: Developing economies 1/  Commitments: Developed economies 2/
Activity  Market access  National treatment  Market access  National treatment
Full  Partial  None  Full  |  Partial  None  Full  Partial  I  None  Full  I Partial  None
Professional services  Number of countries  Number of countries
Legal  7  17  81  9  14  82  1  24  1  1  24  1
Accounting  12  13  80  15  10  80  4  21  1  4  21  1
Medical and dental  10  9  86  14  6  85  3  2  21  4  1  21
Total, professional services  29  39  247  38  30  247  8  47  23  9  46  23
Communication  services  __2_3_2
Voice telephone  3  42  60  10  33  62  3  22  1  5  20  1
Private leased circuit  3  36  66  15  22  68  3  22  1  5  20  1
Electronic mail  11  23  71  22  12  71  4  22  0  4  22  0
Total, communications
services  17  101  197  47  67  201  10  66  2  14  62  2
Distribution  services
Wholesale  8  6  91  8  7  90  1  24  1  13  12  1
Retail  5  6  94  5  6  94  2  23  1  1  24  1
Total, distribution services  13  12  185  13  13  184  3  47  2  14  36  2
Financial  services  l
Non-life insurance  13  17  75  18  13  74  0  4  22  0  4  22
Depositing  16  11  78  19  9  77  0  |  4  22  0  4  22
Lending  12  16  71  17  12  70  0  15  85  0  15  85
Trading in securities  13  17  75  18  1  3  74  0  4  22  0  4  22
Total, financial services  47  1  63  F  310  1  62  j  47  |  311  1  37  66  2  36  66
Source: WTO  Secretariat
1/  Total of 105  Members
2/ Total of 26 Members
57TABLE S2: MODE 3  COMMITMENTS IN SELECTED SERVICES SECTORS
Commitments: Developing economies 1/  Commitments: Developed economies 2/
Activity  Market access  National treatment  Market access  National treatment
Full  Partial  None  Full  Partial  I  None  Full  Partial  I  None  Full
Number of countries  Number of countries
Professional services
Legal  2  26  77  7  21  77  0  24  2  0  24  2
Accounting  4  36  65  15  24  66  1  25  0  3  23  0
Medical and dental  8  21  76  16  12  77  0  16  10  1  16  9
Total, professional services  14  83  218  38  57  220  1  65  12  4  63  11
Communication services
Voice telephone  4  46  55  8  39  58  0  25  1  2  23  1
Private leased circuit  2  39  64  13  24  68  0  25  1  2  23  1
Electronic mail  3  32  70  20  14  71  1  25  0  3  23  0
Total, communications
services  9  117  189  41  77  197  1  75  2  7  69  2
Distribution services
Wholesale  6  14  85  6  13  86  0  25  1  0  25  1
Retail  2  15  88  3  15  87  1  24  1  0  25  1
Total, distribution services  8  29  173  9  2_8  173  1  49  2  0  50  2
Financial services
Non-life insurance  5  40  60  9  34  62  0  26  0  T  0  26  0
Depositing  I  1  44  50  13  42  50  1  1  24  1  0  25  11
Lending  11  41  53  11  41  53  1  24  1  T 0  25  |  1
Trading in securities  8  37  60  6  1  39  60  1  1  25  0  0  26  0
Total, financial services  35  162  223  39  156  225  3  99  2  |  0  102  - 2
Source:  WTO Secretariat
1/ Total of 105 Members
2/ Total of 26 Members
58TABLE  S3: PERCENTAGES  OF DEVELOPING  AND OF DEVELOPED  ECONOMIES
THAT  GAVE FULL  MARKET  ACCESS  OR  FULL  NATIONAL TREATMENT
COMMITMENTS  ON SELECTED  SERVICE  SECTORS
Market Access  National treatment
Cross border provision  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed
(Mode 1)  Economies  Economies  Economies  Economies
Professional services  9  10  12  12
Communication services  5  13  15  18
Distribution services  6  6  6  27
Financial services  11  1  15  2
All selected sectors  8  7  13  13
Market Access  National treatment
Commercial presence  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed
(Mode 3)  Economies  Economies  Economies  Economies
Professional services  9  10  12  12
Communication services  5  13  1  S  18
Distribution services  4  2  4  0
Financial services  8  3  9  0
All selected sectors  5  2  10  4
Source: Tabulated from Table SI.
59TABLE S4: PERCENTAGES  OF DEVELOPING  AND  OF DEVELOPED  ECONOMIES  THAT MADE
SOME MARKET  ACCESS  OR SOME  NATIONAL  TREATMENT  COMMITMENTS  ON  SELECTED
SERVICE  SECTORS
Market Access  National treatment
Cross border provision  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed
(Mode 1)  Economies  Economies  Economies  Economies
Professional  services  22  71  22  71
Communication  services  37  97  36  97
Distribution  services  12  96  12  96
Financial  services  26  37  26  37
All selected  sectors  25  70  25  70
Market  Access  National  treatment
Commercial  presence  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed
(Mode  3)  Economies  Economies  Economies  Economies
Professional  services  22  71  22  71
Communication  services  37  97  36  97
Distribution  services  1_8  96  1_8  96
Financial  services  47  98  46  98
All selected  sectors  36  94  35  95
Source: Tabulated from Table S2.
608.  SUMMARY  FINDINGS
The Uruguay  Round  was the biggest  market  access  round ever. Measured  across  its
coverage  of access to markets  for merchandise,  its tariff reductions  - when the 1997  agreement
on information  technology  products  is included  - exceeds  the approximately  35 percent shares  of
world imports  covered  by the Kennedy  and Tokyo  Rounds.  In addition,  the Uruguay  Round
agreement  eliminated  VERs and made significant  progress  to eliminate  developed  economies'
quantitative  restrictions  on imports  of textiles  and clothing  and all economies'  NTBs on imports
of agricultural  products.
TARIFF CUTS
Various  reports  of the round described  the depth  of the tariff cut as "one-third,"  or even
as "a forty percent  cut." When we take into account  imports  on which  tariffs were not reduced
(including  those duty-free  when  the round began)  and  when we follow a formula  for the tariff
reduction  that measures  how much  more an exporter  will be able  to retain from a dollar of
expenditure  by an importer,  we come  to more modest  figures. Export  sales to industrial
countries  will retain  about 1 percent  more  than without  the Uruguay  Round  cuts, exports  sales to
developing  countries  will retain about  2.3 percent  more. Applied  to 1997  world imports
(excluding  intra-  trade area imports)  of some  3.6 trillion  dollars  ($3.6 x 1012) that comes  to $50
b  i  l  l  ;  ~~~~~~~46 billion/year more for exporters. 4
Developing  economies  (except  for some  of the least developed  countries)  were full
participants  in the market access  negotiations. Their  tariff reductions  covered  as large a share  of
their imports  as did those  of the developed  economies,  their tariff cuts - when measured  by how
they  will affect exporters'  receipts  - were deeper  than  those of the developed  economies. The
percentage  of imports  covered  by GATT-bound  rates  is now almost  as high for the developed
economies  as for the developed.
QUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS
The Uruguay  Round  safeguard  agreement  requires  the phasing  out of all existing
safeguard  (GATT  Article  XIX) measures  and all VERs and  other restraints  that would  not be
legal under  the Uruguay  Round  safeguard  rules.  Good  evidence  indicates  that these measures  are
indeed  on their way out. The safeguards  agreement  provides  for notification  of VERs,
notification  by exporting  (i.e., constrained)  countries  as well as by importing  countries. Except
for Nigerian  restrictions  on grain and  kaolin  imports,  for which  no elimination  date was
specified,  all notified  restrictions  will be eliminated  by the end of 1999.
As to remaining  NTBs of other  forms (e.g.,  restrictive  import  licensing  procedures,  price
control  measures)  a 1997  OECD  survey  of its members  found such  measures  on a small
percentage  of tariff lines  - 4 percent or lower  for the OECD  countries  covered  in the survey. A
similar  tabulation  of NTB incidence  among  developing  economies  based on information  from
WTO  Trade Policy Reviews  indicates  a wider  range of NTB incidence  among  these countries.
For Hong  Kong and for Singapore,  the tabulation  found virtually  no NTBs, for Brazil,  India and
Indonesia  a relatively  high number. The tabulation  also indicates  that Latin American  countries
46 $50  x 10
9.
61that have undertaken major tariff reductions in the past 10 or 15 years have also significantly
reduced their NTBs - e.g., Argentina and Chile.
Some quantitative restrictions remain.  Those related to the protection of human, animal
and plant health, to the application of industrial standards, or to trade in arms and munitions are
clearly GATT-legal.  Agreements on the application at the border of health and industrial
standards will facilitate the policing of the temptation to use such measures as disguised forms of
protection.  A few countries maintain restrictive measures under GATT provisions that allow
such to protect the balance of payments, but continuing negotiating pressure has significantly
reduced the application of such measures.
TEXTILES AND CLOTHING
A major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round is an agreement to eliminate the Multi
Fiber Arrangement and an accompanying bound commnitment  by countries that now apply import
quotas sanctioned by the MFA to eliminate these restrictions.  In addition, the developed
economies agreed to tariff cuts on textiles that are deeper than those on other industrial products.
The dark side of this accomplishment:
*  The agreement is written in such a way that the developed economies will be able to legally
put off elimination of MFA restrictions until 2005.  While the provision of four "stages"
suggests that 33 percent of the agreed liberalization should have been in place by the end of
1997, in fact the US has eliminated only 1 percent of its MFA quotas, the EU 7 percent.
- Developed economies' tariffs on textiles and clothing remain two to three times higher than
their tariffs on other industrial goods.
The agreement provides for the application of "transitional safeguards" (MFA-like
restraints) on products not under such restraint when the agreement came into effect, but the use
of these has been minimal.  Three different importing countries through April 1999 have applied
a total of 35 such measures; but as of April 1999, only two of these had not been rescinded.
AGRICULTURE
The major accomplishment of the agriculture agreement is the creation of a "tariffs only"
regime - the replacement of all NTBs by tariffs plus the binding of all agricultural tariffs (those
that replace NTBs as well as those on products previously protected only by tariffs.)  This
conversion to tariffs was accompanied by reductions of import protection levels that were
narrower in scope, but deeper than tariff reductions on industrial products. A special safeguards
provision, applicable only to tariffied products, has been minimally used.
A close look at implementation suggests however that the public relations dimensions of
the agriculture agreement may have outpaced the substance of liberalization.  While the further
use of NTBs is explicitly banned, the conversion formulas for setting tariffs "equivalent" to the
NTBs they replaced were negotiating guidelines, not legal obligations. 47 Likewise, the often
cited 36 percent cut by developed economies and 24 percent cut by developing economies were
guidelines, not legal obligations - and could be made meaningless for tariffied products by the
possibility of setting inflated tariff equivalents. Instances of such inflated tariff equivalents have
47 Developing and developed economies alike were required to eliminate NTBs, but the negotiating guidelines
allowed developing economies to apply ceiling bindings rather than tariffs equivalent to their NTBs.
62appeared in the press, e.g., Japan has set a specific tariff 48 on rice that at present prices amounts
to 1,000 percent, ad valorem.  The post Uruguay Round tariff rates are lower than the tariff
equivalent of pre- Uruguay Round protection for only 14 percent of products that underwent
tarification.
Perhaps the most illiberal element in the WTO agricultural regime is the use of tariff
quotas to implement minimum access provisions.  Except for rice imports by Japan and Korea,
the tariff quota system has had little effect on the amount of trade, and it has preserved the old
system of political bargaining over the allocation among exporters of restricted import access -
managed trade, not liberalized trade.
The agriculture agreement provides for further negotiations, to begin in 2000.  Unlike the
textiles and clothing agreement, the agriculture agreement includes no binding commitment for
further removal of restrictions.
ANTIDUMPING
In the mid 1980s to early 1990s antidumping became the most popular tool for
governments seeking a GATT-legal means to accommodate a domestic industry that was
clamoring for protection.  With the significant strides toward liberalization achieved at the
Uruguay Round, including the banning of VERs (the favored instrument the previous decade),
there were fears that antidumping would be even more intensely used.
To now, fears of such a surge have not been realized.  The number of antidumping
measures introduced by the traditional users (Australia, Canada, EU, US) has been less since
1995 than it had been in the years just before. A number of developing economies have however
become major users - over 30 WTO members have notified antidumping actions since the
Uruguay Round Agreements came into effect.  Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and India have become
major users, with numbers of cases per dollar of imports considerably higher than the ratios for
traditional users.
China is the most frequent target for antidumping actions, followed by the United States.
Per dollar of exports, antidumnping  initiations against an economy are much higher against
developing economies.  Thus the generalization that describes tariffs can be extended to
antidumping: it is disproportionally used by developing economies, it is disproportionally used
against developing economies.
Where antidumping duties have been applied, they have provided a degree of protection
much higher than what was taken away by Uruguay Round tariff reductions.  Antidumping
duties of 30 to 50 percent are common, many are higher.  By comparison, reductions agreed at
the Uruguay Round were in the range of 2 to 4 percentage points.
COUNTERVAILING  DUTIES
WTO Members take countervailing measures more often than safeguard actions under
Article XIX, but not nearly so often as they use antidumping to protect local producers - in
1992-98, some 2,000 antidumping investigations initiated, 200 countervailing duty
investigations.  The number of countervailing duty cases dropped sharply in the first three years
the Uruguay Round Agreements were in force, but incomplete information indicates that in 1998
48 Per kilo, rather  than ad valorem.
63the number of cases is back up to pre-1995 levels.  The US is by far the largest user, more than
40 percent of initiations in the 1990s were by the US.  Developing countries, particularly Brazil,
Chile and Mexico, are other frequent users.
SAFEGUARDS
The major accomplishment of the safeguard agreement is that it has been successful in
curtailing protection outside the multilateral framework. VERs that existed when the agreement
came into effect have been phased out, and through March 1999, there have been no complaints
that the prohibition of gray area measures has been violated. Some WTO Members hoped that in
lifting the compensation requirement on time-bound and degressive safeguard measures, the
agreement would make safeguard measures more user friendly and perhaps shift usage away
from antidumping.  This seems not to have occurred - in 1995-98, when there were almost 900
antidumping initiations, only 19 safeguard investigations were initiated.  In only one of the seven
countries initiating safeguard investigations did the cases cover as much as l/2  of 1 percent of
total imports.
Fourteen of the 19 safeguard initiations were by developing economies.
SERVICES
Since the Uruguay Round, the multilateral trading system includes disciplines and
liberalization commitments covering trade in services. Although experts who have reviewed the
outcome of the negotiations have concluded that the first round of services negotiations did not
result in far-reaching trade liberalization, they also point out that the importance of bringing
services under the multilateral umbrella of the WTO should not be underestimated.  In most
countries, at least half of GDP is generated in the services sector and the share is increasing. At
the same time, less than one quarter of reported world trade is in services.
Overall, the Uruguay Round Agreements were a notable step toward opening world
markets.  Developing economies stepping forward as equal partners with the developing
economies in working toward an open global trading system was an equally notable event.  The
Uruguay Round Agreements preserved and perhaps extended the provisions for imposing new
trade restrictions, but so far resort to these provisions has been minimal.  Since the entry into
force of the Uruguay Round Agreements, use of traditional trade remedies - e.g., antidumping,
countervailing duties - has been below rates in the decade before.  Spread of use of antidumping
to developing economies - the intensity of their use of this instrument, especially against imports
from other developing economies - is however a matter of concern.
64TABLE SF1: TARIFF  CONCESSIONS AND LEVELS ON ALL MERCHANDISE, INDUSTRIAL
GOODS,  TEXTILES AND CLOTHING, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS - DEVELOPED
ECONOMIES AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES COMBINED
Bindings, post  Tariff reductions  Post Uruguay Round
Uruguay  average tariff
Round  Scope  Depth  Bound  Applied
imports  imports  dT/(1+T)
All merchandise  97  30  1.2  7  4
Industrial goods  91  32  1.3  6  4
Textiles and clothing  80  53  1.6  12  10
All Agricultural  100  25  2.6  24  14
products
Tariffied  Agricultural  100  14  4.2  32  25
Productsa
Not tariffied agricultural  100  32  1.4  19  8
productsb  b
Notes:
a Products protected before the Uruguay Round by NTBs - that were converted to tariffs.
b Products protected before the Uruguay Round by tariffs - with no NTBs to convert.
TABLE SF3:  POST URUGUAY ROUND TARIFF RATES DEVELOPED ECONOMIES AND
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES -PERCENT  AD VALOREM
Bound  Applied
Developed Developing  Developed  Developing
economies  economies  economies  economies
All merchandise  4  25  3  13
Industrial products  4  20  3  13
Textiles and clothing  11  f  24  8  21
Agricultural  productsa  '  15  60  14  18
Note: a Includes tariffied and not-tariffied products.
65TABLE  SF2: SUMMARY OF URUGUAY ROUND  CONCESSIONS  BY  DEVELOPED  ECONOMIES
AND BY  DEVELOPING  ECONOMIES
All  Industrial  Textiles  All
merchandise  products  and  Agricultural
clothing  products
Bindings, post Uruguay Round -
% of imports
Developed economies  89  92  80  100
Developing economies  91  84  85  100
Uruguay Round Tariff  Cuts
Scope - % of imports
Developed  economies  30  32  53  26
Developing  economies  29  |  33  49  17
Depth - dT/(1+T) as %
Developed economies  1.0  1.0  1.4  1.5
Developing economies  2.3  2.7  4.1  4.7
Post Uruguay Round average
tariffs - percent, ad valorem
Bound
Developed economies  4  4  11  15
Developing economies  25  20  24  60
Applied
Developed economies  3  3  8  13
Developing economies  13  13  21  18
66TABLE SF4: PERCENTAGES OF ANTIDUMPING  INITIATIONS, JULY 1996 - JUNE 1998
AGAINST DIFFERENT GROUPS OF ECONOMIES
Initiating  economy  Targeted  economy
China  Developed  Developing  Transition
Developed  19  31
economies
Developing  25  35  24  15
economies  _  _  3  24  15
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